linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V3 0/3] KVM/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V direct tlb flush support

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Message-ID: <87v9uilr5x.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 27 Aug 2019 14:38:18 +0200
From:   Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
To:     Tianyu Lan <lantianyu1986@...il.com>
Cc:     Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>, kvm <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org,
        "linux-kernel\@vger kernel org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@...hat.com>, corbet@....net,
        KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>,
        Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>,
        Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@...rosoft.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        michael.h.kelley@...rosoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 0/3] KVM/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V direct tlb flush support

Tianyu Lan <lantianyu1986@...il.com> writes:

> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 2:41 PM Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>> lantianyu1986@...il.com writes:
>>
>> > From: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>
>> >
>> > This patchset is to add Hyper-V direct tlb support in KVM. Hyper-V
>> > in L0 can delegate L1 hypervisor to handle tlb flush request from
>> > L2 guest when direct tlb flush is enabled in L1.
>> >
>> > Patch 2 introduces new cap KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH to enable
>> > feature from user space. User space should enable this feature only
>> > when Hyper-V hypervisor capability is exposed to guest and KVM profile
>> > is hided. There is a parameter conflict between KVM and Hyper-V hypercall.
>> > We hope L2 guest doesn't use KVM hypercall when the feature is
>> > enabled. Detail please see comment of new API
>> > "KVM_CAP_HYPERV_DIRECT_TLBFLUSH"
>>
>> I was thinking about this for awhile and I think I have a better
>> proposal. Instead of adding this new capability let's enable direct TLB
>> flush when KVM guest enables Hyper-V Hypercall page (writes to
>> HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL) - this guarantees that the guest doesn't need KVM
>> hypercalls as we can't handle both KVM-style and Hyper-V-style
>> hypercalls simultaneously and kvm_emulate_hypercall() does:
>>
>>         if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
>>                 return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu);
>>
>> What do you think?
>>
>> (and instead of adding the capability we can add kvm.ko module parameter
>> to enable direct tlb flush unconditionally, like
>> 'hv_direct_tlbflush=-1/0/1' with '-1' being the default (autoselect
>> based on Hyper-V hypercall enablement, '0' - permanently disabled, '1' -
>> permanenetly enabled)).
>>
>
> Hi Vitaly::
>      Actually, I had such idea before. But user space should check
> whether hv tlb flush
> is exposed to VM before enabling direct tlb flush. If no, user space
> should not direct
> tlb flush for guest since Hyper-V will do more check for each
> hypercall from nested
> VM with enabling the feauter..

If TLB Flush enlightenment is not exposed to the VM at all there's no
difference if we enable direct TLB flush in eVMCS or not: the guest
won't be using 'TLB Flush' hypercall and will do TLB flushing with
IPIs. And, in case the guest enables Hyper-V hypercall page, it is
definitelly not going to use KVM hypercalls so we can't break these.

-- 
Vitaly