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Message-ID: <20190828161641.GJ2369@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 18:16:41 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Vineeth Remanan Pillai <vpillai@...italocean.com>,
Nishanth Aravamudan <naravamudan@...italocean.com>,
Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@...italocean.com>,
mingo@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, pjt@...gle.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
subhra.mazumdar@...cle.com, fweisbec@...il.com,
keescook@...omium.org, kerrnel@...gle.com,
Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>, Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@...il.com>,
Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@...il.com>,
Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/16] Core scheduling v3
On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 08:59:21AM -0700, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 8/27/19 2:50 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 10:14:17PM +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> Apple have provided a sysctl that allows applications to indicate that
> >> specific threads should make use of core isolation while allowing
> >> the rest of the system to make use of SMT, and browsers (Safari, Firefox
> >> and Chrome, at least) are now making use of this. Trying to do something
> >> similar using cgroups seems a bit awkward. Would something like this be
> >> reasonable?
> >
> > Sure; like I wrote earlier; I only did the cgroup thing because I was
> > lazy and it was the easiest interface to hack on in a hurry.
> >
> > The rest of the ABI nonsense can 'trivially' be done later; if when we
> > decide to actually do this.
> >
> > And given MDS, I'm still not entirely convinced it all makes sense. If
> > it were just L1TF, then yes, but now...
> >
>
> For MDS, core-scheduler does prevent thread to thread
> attack between user space threads running on sibling CPU threads.
> Yes, it doesn't prevent the user to kernel attack from sibling
> which will require additional mitigation measure. However, it does
> block a major attack vector for MDS if HT is enabled.
I'm not sure what your argument is; the dike has two holes; you plug
one, you still drown.
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