linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

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Message-ID: <3802.1567182778@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:   Fri, 30 Aug 2019 17:32:58 +0100
From:   David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:     Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>
Cc:     dhowells@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com> wrote:

> From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> 
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@...e.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>