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Message-ID: <de10425d-4d63-29e1-63be-1566099a5ab6@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 08:31:45 -0400
From: Nayna <nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@...abs.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@...ula.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com>,
Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@...ibm.com>,
George Wilson <gcwilson@...ux.ibm.com>,
Eric Ricther <erichte@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] powerpc: Add support to initialize ima policy
rules
On 09/02/2019 07:52 AM, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Hi Nayna,
Hi Michael,
>
> Some more comments below.
>
> Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com> writes:
>> POWER secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to
>> perform the OS kernel image signature verification.
> Again this is just a design choice we've made, it's not specified
> anywhere or anything like that. And it only applies to bare metal secure
> boot, at least so far. AIUI.
Yes. I will make it consistent to use "PowerNV".
>> Since each secure
>> boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of
>> the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is
>> required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled,
>> only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are
>> defined.
> It's probably worth mentioning that we intend to use this in our
> Linux-based boot loader, which uses kexec, and that's one of the reasons
> why we're particularly interested in defining the rules for kexec?
Yes. Agreed. I will update patch description to add this.
>
>> This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the
>> secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy
>> rules.
>>
>> This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT
>> config is enabled.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 ++
>> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +-
>> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-
>> 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>> index c902a39124dc..42109682b727 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
>> @@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
>> bool
>> default n
>> depends on PPC64
>> + depends on IMA
>> + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
>> help
>> Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define
>> security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
>> index d310ebb4e526..520b1c814197 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
>> @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif
>> obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
>> obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o
>>
>> -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o
>>
>> # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
>> GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..ac90fac83338
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
>> + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
>> + *
>> + * ima_arch.c
>> + * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/ima.h>
>> +#include <asm/secboot.h>
>> +
>> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
>> +{
>> + return get_powerpc_secureboot();
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements
>> + */
>> +static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = {
>> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
>> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
>> + NULL
>> +};
> The rules above seem fairly self explanatory.
>
>> +
>> +/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */
>> +static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = {
>> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
>> + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
>> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
>> +#else
>> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig",
>> + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
>> +#endif
> But these ones are not so obvious, at least to me who knows very little
> about IMA.
>
> Can you add a one line comment to each of the ones in here saying what
> it does and why we want it?
Sure.
>
>> + NULL
>> +};
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list
>> + * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system.
> Why? Just because we think it's useful? Would be good to provide some
> further justification.
Sure. I will clarify this in the next version.
Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna
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