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Message-Id: <20190910115527.5235-15-kpsingh@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 13:55:27 +0200
From: KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...omium.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@...rochip.com>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@...ronome.com>,
Andrey Ignatov <rdna@...com>, Joe Stringer <joe@...d.net.nz>
Subject: [RFC v1 14/14] krsi: Pin arg pages only when needed
From: KP Singh <kpsingh@...gle.com>
Adds a callback which is called when a new program is attached
to a hook. The callback registered by the process_exection hook
checks if a program that has calls to a helper that requires pages to
be pinned (eg. krsi_get_env_var).
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@...gle.com>
---
include/linux/krsi.h | 1 +
security/krsi/include/hooks.h | 5 ++-
security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h | 7 ++++
security/krsi/krsi.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/krsi/ops.c | 10 ++++-
5 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/krsi.h b/include/linux/krsi.h
index c7d1790d0c1f..e443d0309764 100644
--- a/include/linux/krsi.h
+++ b/include/linux/krsi.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_KRSI
int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog);
+extern const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto;
#else
static inline int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr,
struct bpf_prog *prog)
diff --git a/security/krsi/include/hooks.h b/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
index e070c452b5de..38293125ff99 100644
--- a/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
+++ b/security/krsi/include/hooks.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* Format:
*
- * KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, LSM_HOOK, KRSI_HOOK_FN)
+ * KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, LSM_HOOK, KRSI_HOOK_FN, CALLBACK)
*
* KRSI adds one layer of indirection between the name of the hook and the name
* it exposes to the userspace in Security FS to prevent the userspace from
@@ -18,4 +18,5 @@
KRSI_HOOK_INIT(PROCESS_EXECUTION,
process_execution,
bprm_check_security,
- krsi_process_execution)
+ krsi_process_execution,
+ krsi_process_execution_cb)
diff --git a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
index 6152847c3b08..99801d5b273a 100644
--- a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
+++ b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ struct krsi_ctx {
};
};
+typedef int (*krsi_prog_attach_t) (struct bpf_prog_array *);
+
/*
* The LSM creates one file per hook.
*
@@ -61,6 +63,11 @@ struct krsi_hook {
* The eBPF programs that are attached to this hook.
*/
struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs;
+ /*
+ * The attach callback is called before a new program is attached
+ * to the hook and is passed the updated bpf_prog_array as an argument.
+ */
+ krsi_prog_attach_t attach_callback;
};
extern struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[];
diff --git a/security/krsi/krsi.c b/security/krsi/krsi.c
index 00a7150c1b22..a4443d7aa150 100644
--- a/security/krsi/krsi.c
+++ b/security/krsi/krsi.c
@@ -5,15 +5,65 @@
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/krsi.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include "krsi_init.h"
+/*
+ * need_arg_pages is only updated in bprm_check_security_cb
+ * when a mutex on krsi_hook for bprm_check_security is already
+ * held. need_arg_pages avoids pinning pages when no program
+ * that needs them is attached to the hook.
+ */
+static bool need_arg_pages;
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the instruction is a BPF_CALL to an eBPF helper located
+ * at the given address.
+ */
+static inline bool bpf_is_call_to_func(struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ void *func_addr)
+{
+ u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+
+ if (opcode != BPF_CALL)
+ return false;
+
+ if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * The BPF verifier updates the value of insn->imm from the
+ * enum bpf_func_id to the offset of the address of helper
+ * from the __bpf_call_base.
+ */
+ return __bpf_call_base + insn->imm == func_addr;
+}
+
+static int krsi_process_execution_cb(struct bpf_prog_array *array)
+{
+ struct bpf_prog_array_item *item = array->items;
+ struct bpf_prog *p;
+ const struct bpf_func_proto *proto = &krsi_get_env_var_proto;
+ int i;
+
+ while ((p = READ_ONCE(item->prog))) {
+ for (i = 0; i < p->len; i++) {
+ if (bpf_is_call_to_func(&p->insnsi[i], proto->func))
+ need_arg_pages = true;
+ }
+ item++;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[] = {
- #define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, H, I) \
+ #define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(TYPE, NAME, H, I, CB) \
[TYPE] = { \
.h_type = TYPE, \
.name = #NAME, \
+ .attach_callback = CB, \
},
#include "hooks.h"
#undef KRSI_HOOK_INIT
@@ -75,9 +125,11 @@ static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
.bprm = bprm,
};
- ret = pin_arg_pages(&ctx.bprm_ctx);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_arg_pages;
+ if (READ_ONCE(need_arg_pages)) {
+ ret = pin_arg_pages(&ctx.bprm_ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_arg_pages;
+ }
ret = krsi_run_progs(PROCESS_EXECUTION, &ctx);
kfree(ctx.bprm_ctx.arg_pages);
@@ -87,7 +139,7 @@ static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
static struct security_hook_list krsi_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
- #define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(T, N, HOOK, IMPL) LSM_HOOK_INIT(HOOK, IMPL),
+ #define KRSI_HOOK_INIT(T, N, HOOK, IMPL, CB) LSM_HOOK_INIT(HOOK, IMPL),
#include "hooks.h"
#undef KRSI_HOOK_INIT
};
diff --git a/security/krsi/ops.c b/security/krsi/ops.c
index 1db94dfaac15..2de682371eff 100644
--- a/security/krsi/ops.c
+++ b/security/krsi/ops.c
@@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
goto unlock;
}
+ if (h->attach_callback) {
+ ret = h->attach_callback(new_array);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ bpf_prog_array_free(new_array);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ }
+
rcu_assign_pointer(h->progs, new_array);
bpf_prog_array_free(old_array);
@@ -278,7 +286,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(krsi_get_env_var, struct krsi_ctx *, ctx, char *, name, u32, n_size,
return get_env_var(ctx, name, dest, n_size, size);
}
-static const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto = {
+const struct bpf_func_proto krsi_get_env_var_proto = {
.func = krsi_get_env_var,
.gpl_only = true,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
--
2.20.1
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