linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 20/21] vhost: block speculation of translated descriptors

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Message-Id: <20190913130509.381176459@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 13 Sep 2019 14:07:13 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 20/21] vhost: block speculation of translated descriptors

From: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com>

commit a89db445fbd7f1f8457b03759aa7343fa530ef6b upstream.

iovec addresses coming from vhost are assumed to be
pre-validated, but in fact can be speculated to a value
out of range.

Userspace address are later validated with array_index_nospec so we can
be sure kernel info does not leak through these addresses, but vhost
must also not leak userspace info outside the allowed memory table to
guests.

Following the defence in depth principle, make sure
the address is not validated out of node range.

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -1954,8 +1954,10 @@ static int translate_desc(struct vhost_v
 		_iov = iov + ret;
 		size = node->size - addr + node->start;
 		_iov->iov_len = min((u64)len - s, size);
-		_iov->iov_base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)
-			(node->userspace_addr + addr - node->start);
+		_iov->iov_base = (void __user *)
+			((unsigned long)node->userspace_addr +
+			 array_index_nospec((unsigned long)(addr - node->start),
+					    node->size));
 		s += size;
 		addr += size;
 		++ret;