linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

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Message-ID: <eed916f3-73e1-2695-4cd1-0b252ac9b553@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 13 Sep 2019 13:38:18 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com,
        nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com, serge.ayoun@...el.com,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
        kai.svahn@...el.com, bp@...en8.de, josh@...htriplett.org,
        luto@...nel.org, kai.huang@...el.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        cedric.xing@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v22 00/24] Intel SGX foundations

On 9/3/19 7:26 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Not having LSM hooks does not cause any risk to other parts of the
> kernel as the device can still be controlled by using DAC permissions.
> The hooks just provide more granularity than DAC in access decisions.

Could we translate the security-speak to english, please? :)

Is this it:

	LSMs can (try to) enforce things like "all executable code must
	be verified".  The implementation in these patches has the
	potential to subvert policies like that since it has its own
	unique mechanisms for loading and mapping executable code.  This
	will be fixed by future LSM enhancements on top of this set.
	For now, permissions on the SGX device file should be used to
	prevent untrusted users from using SGX to subvert LSM policies.

?