Message-ID: <bb2d4453-f01f-8fb2-d901-a7a0a5eb4a4d@fb.com>
Date:   Sat, 14 Sep 2019 16:56:52 +0000
From:   Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
To:     KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "bpf@...r.kernel.org" <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...omium.org>,
        "Michael Halcrow" <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
        Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
        Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
        Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>,
        Martin Lau <kafai@...com>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "Mauro Carvalho Chehab" <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@...rochip.com>,
        Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        "Quentin Monnet" <quentin.monnet@...ronome.com>,
        Andrey Ignatov <rdna@...com>, "Joe Stringer" <joe@...d.net.nz>
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 06/14] krsi: Implement eBPF operations, attachment and
 execution



On 9/10/19 12:55 PM, KP Singh wrote:
> From: KP Singh <kpsingh@...gle.com>
> 
> A user space program can attach an eBPF program by:
> 
>    hook_fd = open("/sys/kernel/security/krsi/process_execution", O_RDWR)
>    prog_fd = bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...)
>    bpf(BPF_PROG_ATTACH, hook_fd, prog_fd)
> 
> When such an attach call is received, the attachment logic looks up the
> dentry and appends the program to the bpf_prog_array.
> 
> The BPF programs are stored in a bpf_prog_array and writes to the array
> are guarded by a mutex. The eBPF programs are executed as a part of the
> LSM hook they are attached to. If any of the eBPF programs return
> an error (-ENOPERM) the action represented by the hook is denied.
> 
> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@...gle.com>
> ---
>   include/linux/krsi.h              |  18 ++++++
>   kernel/bpf/syscall.c              |   3 +-
>   security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h |  51 +++++++++++++++
>   security/krsi/krsi.c              |  13 +++-
>   security/krsi/krsi_fs.c           |  28 ++++++++
>   security/krsi/ops.c               | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   6 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 include/linux/krsi.h
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/krsi.h b/include/linux/krsi.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c7d1790d0c1f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/krsi.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +
> +#ifndef _KRSI_H
> +#define _KRSI_H
> +
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_KRSI
> +int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog);
> +#else
> +static inline int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr,
> +				   struct bpf_prog *prog)
> +{
> +	return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_KRSI */
> +
> +#endif /* _KRSI_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index f38a539f7e67..ab063ed84258 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
>   #include <linux/bpf.h>
>   #include <linux/bpf_trace.h>
>   #include <linux/bpf_lirc.h>
> +#include <linux/krsi.h>
>   #include <linux/btf.h>
>   #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>   #include <linux/slab.h>
> @@ -1950,7 +1951,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
>   		ret = lirc_prog_attach(attr, prog);
>   		break;
>   	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KRSI:
> -		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		ret = krsi_prog_attach(attr, prog);
>   		break;
>   	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR:
>   		ret = skb_flow_dissector_bpf_prog_attach(attr, prog);
> diff --git a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
> index 68755182a031..4e17ecacd4ed 100644
> --- a/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
> +++ b/security/krsi/include/krsi_init.h
> @@ -5,12 +5,29 @@
>   
>   #include "krsi_fs.h"
>   
> +#include <linux/binfmts.h>
> +
>   enum krsi_hook_type {
>   	PROCESS_EXECUTION,
>   	__MAX_KRSI_HOOK_TYPE, /* delimiter */
>   };
>   
>   extern int krsi_fs_initialized;
> +
> +struct krsi_bprm_ctx {
> +	struct linux_binprm *bprm;
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * krsi_ctx is the context that is passed to all KRSI eBPF
> + * programs.
> + */
> +struct krsi_ctx {
> +	union {
> +		struct krsi_bprm_ctx bprm_ctx;
> +	};
> +};
> +
>   /*
>    * The LSM creates one file per hook.
>    *
> @@ -33,10 +50,44 @@ struct krsi_hook {
>   	 * The dentry of the file created in securityfs.
>   	 */
>   	struct dentry *h_dentry;
> +	/*
> +	 * The mutex must be held when updating the progs attached to the hook.
> +	 */
> +	struct mutex mutex;
> +	/*
> +	 * The eBPF programs that are attached to this hook.
> +	 */
> +	struct bpf_prog_array __rcu	*progs;
>   };
>   
>   extern struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[];
>   
> +static inline int krsi_run_progs(enum krsi_hook_type t, struct krsi_ctx *ctx)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_prog_array_item *item;
> +	struct bpf_prog *prog;
> +	struct krsi_hook *h = &krsi_hooks_list[t];
> +	int ret, retval = 0;

Reverse christmas tree style?

> +
> +	preempt_disable();

Do we need preempt_disable() here?

> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +
> +	item = rcu_dereference(h->progs)->items;
> +	while ((prog = READ_ONCE(item->prog))) {
> +		ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, ctx);
> +		if (ret < 0) {
> +			retval = ret;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
> +		item++;
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +	preempt_enable();
> +	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_KRSI_ENFORCE) ? retval : 0;
> +}
> +
>   #define krsi_for_each_hook(hook) \
>   	for ((hook) = &krsi_hooks_list[0]; \
>   	     (hook) < &krsi_hooks_list[__MAX_KRSI_HOOK_TYPE]; \
> diff --git a/security/krsi/krsi.c b/security/krsi/krsi.c
> index 77d7e2f91172..d3a4a361c192 100644
> --- a/security/krsi/krsi.c
> +++ b/security/krsi/krsi.c
> @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
>   // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>   
>   #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> +#include <linux/filter.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
> +#include <linux/binfmts.h>
>   
>   #include "krsi_init.h"
>   
> @@ -16,7 +19,15 @@ struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[] = {
>   
>   static int krsi_process_execution(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   {
> -	return 0;
> +	int ret;
> +	struct krsi_ctx ctx;
> +
> +	ctx.bprm_ctx = (struct krsi_bprm_ctx) {
> +		.bprm = bprm,
> +	};
> +
> +	ret = krsi_run_progs(PROCESS_EXECUTION, &ctx);
> +	return ret;
>   }
>   
>   static struct security_hook_list krsi_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> diff --git a/security/krsi/krsi_fs.c b/security/krsi/krsi_fs.c
> index 604f826cee5c..3ba18b52ce85 100644
> --- a/security/krsi/krsi_fs.c
> +++ b/security/krsi/krsi_fs.c
> @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
>   #include <linux/file.h>
>   #include <linux/fs.h>
>   #include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/filter.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
>   #include <linux/security.h>
>   
>   #include "krsi_fs.h"
> @@ -27,12 +29,29 @@ bool is_krsi_hook_file(struct file *f)
>   
>   static void __init krsi_free_hook(struct krsi_hook *h)
>   {
> +	struct bpf_prog_array_item *item;
> +	/*
> +	 * This function is __init so we are guarranteed that there will be
> +	 * no concurrent access.
> +	 */
> +	struct bpf_prog_array *progs = rcu_dereference_raw(h->progs);
> +
> +	if (progs) {

bpf_prog_array itself should never be null?

> +		item = progs->items;
> +		while (item->prog) {
> +			bpf_prog_put(item->prog);
> +			item++;
> +		}
> +		bpf_prog_array_free(progs);
> +	}
> +
>   	securityfs_remove(h->h_dentry);
>   	h->h_dentry = NULL;
>   }
>   
>   static int __init krsi_init_hook(struct krsi_hook *h, struct dentry *parent)
>   {
> +	struct bpf_prog_array __rcu     *progs;
>   	struct dentry *h_dentry;
>   	int ret;
>   
> @@ -41,6 +60,15 @@ static int __init krsi_init_hook(struct krsi_hook *h, struct dentry *parent)
>   
>   	if (IS_ERR(h_dentry))
>   		return PTR_ERR(h_dentry);
> +
> +	mutex_init(&h->mutex);
> +	progs = bpf_prog_array_alloc(0, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!progs) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +
> +	RCU_INIT_POINTER(h->progs, progs);
>   	h_dentry->d_fsdata = h;
>   	h->h_dentry = h_dentry;
>   	return 0;
> diff --git a/security/krsi/ops.c b/security/krsi/ops.c
> index f2de3bd9621e..cf4d06189aa1 100644
> --- a/security/krsi/ops.c
> +++ b/security/krsi/ops.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,112 @@
>   // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>   
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
>   #include <linux/filter.h>
>   #include <linux/bpf.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/krsi.h>
> +
> +#include "krsi_init.h"
> +#include "krsi_fs.h"
> +
> +extern struct krsi_hook krsi_hooks_list[];
> +
> +static struct krsi_hook *get_hook_from_fd(int fd)
> +{
> +	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
> +	struct krsi_hook *h;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!f.file) {
> +		ret = -EBADF;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (!is_krsi_hook_file(f.file)) {
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The securityfs dentry never disappears, so we don't need to take a
> +	 * reference to it.
> +	 */
> +	h = file_dentry(f.file)->d_fsdata;
> +	if (WARN_ON(!h)) {
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto error;
> +	}
> +	fdput(f);
> +	return h;
> +
> +error:
> +	fdput(f);
> +	return ERR_PTR(ret);
> +}
> +
> +int krsi_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_prog_array *old_array;
> +	struct bpf_prog_array *new_array;
> +	struct krsi_hook *h;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	h = get_hook_from_fd(attr->target_fd);
> +	if (IS_ERR(h))
> +		return PTR_ERR(h);
> +
> +	mutex_lock(&h->mutex);
> +	old_array = rcu_dereference_protected(h->progs,
> +					      lockdep_is_held(&h->mutex));
> +
> +	ret = bpf_prog_array_copy(old_array, NULL, prog, &new_array);
> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> +		goto unlock;
> +	}
> +
> +	rcu_assign_pointer(h->progs, new_array);
> +	bpf_prog_array_free(old_array);
> +
> +unlock:
> +	mutex_unlock(&h->mutex);
> +	return ret;
> +}
>   
>   const struct bpf_prog_ops krsi_prog_ops = {
>   };
>   
> +static bool krsi_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
> +				      enum bpf_access_type type,
> +				      const struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +				      struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * KRSI is conservative about any direct access in eBPF to
> +	 * prevent the users from depending on the internals of the kernel and
> +	 * aims at providing a rich eco-system of safe eBPF helpers as an API
> +	 * for accessing relevant information from the context.
> +	 */
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct bpf_func_proto *krsi_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id
> +							 func_id,
> +							 const struct bpf_prog
> +							 *prog)
> +{
> +	switch (func_id) {
> +	case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem:
> +		return &bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto;
> +	case BPF_FUNC_get_current_pid_tgid:
> +		return &bpf_get_current_pid_tgid_proto;
> +	default:
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +}
> +
>   const struct bpf_verifier_ops krsi_verifier_ops = {
> +	.get_func_proto = krsi_prog_func_proto,
> +	.is_valid_access = krsi_prog_is_valid_access,
>   };
> 

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