linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.2 49/85] powerpc: Add barrier_nospec to raw_copy_in

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20190918061235.680501458@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 18 Sep 2019 08:19:07 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@...il.com>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Subject: [PATCH 5.2 49/85] powerpc: Add barrier_nospec to raw_copy_in_user()

From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@...il.com>

commit 6fbcdd59094ade30db63f32316e9502425d7b256 upstream.

Commit ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The
intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled
pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar.

In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the
raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled
pointer.

Fixes: ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const
 {
 	unsigned long ret;
 
+	barrier_nospec();
 	allow_user_access(to, from, n);
 	ret = __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
 	prevent_user_access(to, from, n);