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Message-ID: <20190920163123.GC55224@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 17:31:25 +0100
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, paulmck@...ux.ibm.com,
Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>, Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>,
Anatol Pomazau <anatol@...gle.com>,
Will Deacon <willdeacon@...gle.com>,
Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@...il.com>,
stern@...land.harvard.edu, akiyks@...il.com, npiggin@...il.com,
boqun.feng@...il.com, dlustig@...dia.com, j.alglave@....ac.uk,
luc.maranget@...ia.fr
Subject: Re: Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN)
On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 04:18:57PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> Hi all,
Hi,
> We would like to share a new data-race detector for the Linux kernel:
> Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) --
> https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki/KCSAN (Details:
> https://github.com/google/ktsan/blob/kcsan/Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst)
Nice!
BTW kcsan_atomic_next() is missing a stub definition in <linux/kcsan.h>
when !CONFIG_KCSAN:
https://github.com/google/ktsan/commit/a22a093a0f0d0b582c82cdbac4f133a3f61d207c#diff-19d7c475b4b92aab8ba440415ab786ec
... and I think the kcsan_{begin,end}_atomic() stubs need to be static
inline too.
It looks like this is easy enough to enable on arm64, with the only real
special case being secondary_start_kernel() which we might want to
refactor to allow some portions to be instrumented.
I pushed the trivial patches I needed to get arm64 booting to my arm64/kcsan
branch:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git arm64/kcsan
We have some interesting splats at boot time in stop_machine, which
don't seem to have been hit/fixed on x86 yet in the kcsan-with-fixes
branch, e.g.
[ 0.237939] ==================================================================
[ 0.239431] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in multi_cpu_stop+0xa8/0x198 and set_state+0x80/0xb0
[ 0.241189]
[ 0.241606] write to 0xffff00001003bd00 of 4 bytes by task 24 on cpu 3:
[ 0.243435] set_state+0x80/0xb0
[ 0.244328] multi_cpu_stop+0x16c/0x198
[ 0.245406] cpu_stopper_thread+0x170/0x298
[ 0.246565] smpboot_thread_fn+0x40c/0x560
[ 0.247696] kthread+0x1a8/0x1b0
[ 0.248586] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 0.249589]
[ 0.250006] read to 0xffff00001003bd00 of 4 bytes by task 14 on cpu 1:
[ 0.251804] multi_cpu_stop+0xa8/0x198
[ 0.252851] cpu_stopper_thread+0x170/0x298
[ 0.254008] smpboot_thread_fn+0x40c/0x560
[ 0.255135] kthread+0x1a8/0x1b0
[ 0.256027] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 0.257036]
[ 0.257449] Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
[ 0.258918] CPU: 1 PID: 14 Comm: migration/1 Not tainted 5.3.0-00007-g67ab35a199f4-dirty #3
[ 0.261241] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 0.262517] ==================================================================
> To those of you who we mentioned at LPC that we're working on a
> watchpoint-based KTSAN inspired by DataCollider [1], this is it (we
> renamed it to KCSAN to avoid confusion with KTSAN).
> [1] http://usenix.org/legacy/events/osdi10/tech/full_papers/Erickson.pdf
>
> In the coming weeks we're planning to:
> * Set up a syzkaller instance.
> * Share the dashboard so that you can see the races that are found.
> * Attempt to send fixes for some races upstream (if you find that the
> kcsan-with-fixes branch contains an important fix, please feel free to
> point it out and we'll prioritize that).
>
> There are a few open questions:
> * The big one: most of the reported races are due to unmarked
> accesses; prioritization or pruning of races to focus initial efforts
> to fix races might be required. Comments on how best to proceed are
> welcome. We're aware that these are issues that have recently received
> attention in the context of the LKMM
> (https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/).
I think the big risk here is drive-by "fixes" masking the warnings
rather than fixing the actual issue. It's easy for people to suppress a
warning with {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), so they're liable to do that even the
resulting race isn't benign.
I don't have a clue how to prevent that, though.
> * How/when to upstream KCSAN?
I would love to see this soon!
Thanks,
Mark.
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