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Message-ID: <20190930100212.GA21324@suse.de>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 12:02:12 +0200
From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@...e.de>
To: Stephen Warren <swarren@...dotorg.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
treding@...dia.com, jonathanh@...dia.com,
linux-tegra@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: tegra: only map accessible sysram
On Sun, Sep 29, 2019 at 11:28:43PM -0600, Stephen Warren wrote:
> On 9/29/19 2:08 PM, Mian Yousaf Kaukab wrote:
> > Most of the SysRAM is secure and only accessible by TF-A.
> > Don't map this inaccessible memory in kernel. Only map pages
> > used by bpmp driver.
>
> I don't believe this change is correct. The actual patch doesn't
> implement mapping a subset of the RAM (a software issue), but rather it
> changes the DT representation of the SYSRAM hardware. The SYSRAM
> hardware always does start at 0x30000000, even if a subset of the
> address range is dedicated to a specific purpose. If the kernel must map
> only part of the RAM, then some additional property should indicate
> this.[...]
I agree the hardware description becomes inaccurate with this change.
In the current setup complete 0x3000_0000 to 0x3005_0000 range is being mapped
as normal memory (MT_NORMAL_NC). Though only 0x3004_E000 to 0x3005_0000 are
accessible by the kernel. I am seeing an issue where a read access (which I
believe is speculative) to inaccessible range causes an SError. Another
solution for this problem could be to add "no-memory-wc" to SysRAM node so that
it is mapped as device memory (MT_DEVICE_nGnRE). Would that be acceptable?
> [...] Also, I believe it's incorrect to hard-code into the kernel's DT
> the range of addresses used by the secure monitor/OS, since this can
> vary depending on what the user actually chooses to install as the
> secure monitor/OS. Any indication of such regions should be filled in at
> runtime by some boot firmware or the secure monitor/OS itself, or
> retrieved using some runtime API rather than DT.
Secure-OS addresses are not of interest here. SysRAM is partitioned
between secure-OS and BPMP and kernel is only interested in the BPMP
part. The firmware can update these addresses in the device-tree if it
wants to. Would you prefer something similar implemented in u-boot so
that it updates SysRAM node to only expose kernel accessible part of it
to the kernel?
Can u-boot dynamically figure out the Secure-OS vs BPMP partition?
BR,
Yousaf
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