[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu9dqjZHfCHcHprh32eHTVinwPar1zOYopyMVfp=zPqELg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 13:57:06 +0200
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@...omium.org>,
Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org>,
Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] random: UEFI RNG input is bootloader randomness
On Sat, 28 Sep 2019 at 12:14, Dominik Brodowski
<linux@...inikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>
> Depending on RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER, bootloader-provided randomness
> is credited as entropy. As the UEFI seeding entropy pool is seeded by
> the UEFI firmware/bootloader, add its content as bootloader randomness.
>
> Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only
> implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that
> RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must only be enabled if there indeed is
> sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@...omium.org>
> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@...omium.org>
> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>
>
> ---
>
> Untested patch, as efi_random_get_seed() is only hooked up on ARM,
> and the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31 anyway.
>
> Thanks,
> Dominik
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> index 8f1ab04f6743..db0bffce754e 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
> sizeof(*seed) + size);
> if (seed != NULL) {
> pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
> - add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
> + add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
> early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
> } else {
> pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
Thanks, I like this change. I'll get it queued up in efi/next.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists