Date:   Fri, 4 Oct 2019 11:54:04 +0200
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
Cc:     Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@...il.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        linux-mediatek@...ts.infradead.org,
        wsd_upstream <wsd_upstream@...iatek.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy
 with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y

On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 11:44 AM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 11:18 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 4, 2019 at 10:02 AM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 12:42 +0800, Walter Wu wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 2019-10-03 at 16:53 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Oct 3, 2019 at 3:51 PM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com> wrote:>
> > > > > >
> > > > > >  static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > > > > >  {
> > > > > > -       pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s in %pS\n",
> > > > > > -               get_bug_type(info), (void *)info->ip);
> > > > > > -       pr_err("%s of size %zu at addr %px by task %s/%d\n",
> > > > > > -               info->is_write ? "Write" : "Read", info->access_size,
> > > > > > -               info->access_addr, current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
> > > > > > +       if ((long)info->access_size < 0) {
> > > > > > +               pr_err("BUG: KASAN: invalid size %zu in %pS\n",
> > > > > > +                       info->access_size, (void *)info->ip);
> > > > >
> > > > > I would not introduce a new bug type.
> > > > > These are parsed and used by some systems, e.g. syzbot. If size is
> > > > > user-controllable, then a new bug type for this will mean 2 bug
> > > > > reports.
> > > > > It also won't harm to print Read/Write, definitely the address, so no
> > > > > reason to special case this out of a dozen of report formats.
> > > > > This can qualify as out-of-bounds (definitely will cross some
> > > > > bounds!), so I would change get_bug_type() to return
> > > > > "slab-out-of-bounds" (as the most common OOB) in such case (with a
> > > > > comment).
> > > > >
> > > > Print Read/Write and address information, it is ok.
> > > > But if we can directly point to the root cause of this problem, why we
> > > > not do it?  see 1) and 2) to get a point, if we print OOB, then user
> > > > needs one minute to think what is root case of this problem, but if we
> > > > print invalid size, then user can directly get root case. this is my
> > > > original thinking.
> > > > 1)Invalid size is true then OOB is true.
> > > > 2)OOB is true then invalid size may be true or false.
> > > >
> > > > But I see you say some systems have used bug report so that avoid this
> > > > trouble, i will print the wrong type is "out-of-bound" in a unified way
> > > > when size<0.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Updated my patch, please help to review it.
> > > thanks.
> > >
> > > commit 13e10a7e4264eb25c5a14193068027afc9c261f6
> > > Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> > > Date:   Fri Oct 4 15:27:17 2019 +0800
> > >
> > >     kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function
> > >
> > >     It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative value to
> > > memset()/memcpy()/memmove()
> > >     , so need to be detected by KASAN.
> > >
> > >     If size is negative value, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > >     so that we will qualify as out-of-bounds issue.
> > >
> > >     KASAN report:
> > >
> > >      BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
> > >      Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task
> > > cat/72
> > >
> > >      CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted
> > > 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
> > >      Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
> > >      Call trace:
> > >       dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
> > >       show_stack+0x14/0x20
> > >       dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
> > >       print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
> > >       __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
> > >       kasan_report+0xc/0x18
> > >       check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
> > >       memmove+0x34/0x88
> > >       kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
> > >
> > >     [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
> > >
> > >     Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> > >     Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> > >     Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> > >
> > > diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> > > index 49cc4d570a40..06942cf585cc 100644
> > > --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> > > +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> > > @@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ static noinline void __init
> > > kmalloc_oob_in_memset(void)
> > >         kfree(ptr);
> > >  }
> > >
> > > +static noinline void __init kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(void)
> > > +{
> > > +       char *ptr;
> > > +       size_t size = 64;
> > > +
> > > +       pr_info("invalid size in memmove\n");
> > > +       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > +       if (!ptr) {
> > > +               pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
> > > +               return;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64);
> > > +       memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, -2);
> > > +       kfree(ptr);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >  static noinline void __init kmalloc_uaf(void)
> > >  {
> > >         char *ptr;
> > > @@ -773,6 +790,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
> > >         kmalloc_oob_memset_4();
> > >         kmalloc_oob_memset_8();
> > >         kmalloc_oob_memset_16();
> > > +       kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size();
> > >         kmalloc_uaf();
> > >         kmalloc_uaf_memset();
> > >         kmalloc_uaf2();
> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > > index 6814d6d6a023..97dd6eecc3e7 100644
> > > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
> > >  #undef memset
> > >  void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
> > >  {
> > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > > +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > > +               return NULL;
> > >
> > >         return __memset(addr, c, len);
> > >  }
> > > @@ -110,7 +111,8 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
> > >  #undef memmove
> > >  void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> > >  {
> > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> > > +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_))
> > > +               return NULL;
> > >         check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> >
> > I would check both calls.
> > The current code seems to be over-specialized for handling of invalid
> > size (you assume that if it's invalid size, then the first
> > check_memory_region will detect it and checking the second one is
> > pointless, right?).
> > But check_memory_region can return false in other cases too.
> > Also seeing first call checked, but the second not checked just hurts
> > my eyes when reading code (whenever I will read such code my first
> > reaction will be "why?").
> >
> I can't agree with you any more about second point.
>
> #undef memmove
> void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> {
>     if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_)
> ||)
>         !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
>         return NULL;
>
>     return __memmove(dest, src, len);
> }
>
> >
> > >
> > >         return __memmove(dest, src, len);
> > > @@ -119,7 +121,8 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t
> > > len)
> > >  #undef memcpy
> > >  void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> > >  {
> > > -       check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> > > +       if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_))
> > > +               return NULL;
> > >         check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > >
> > >         return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > > index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644
> > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > > @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool
> > > check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
> > >         if (unlikely(size == 0))
> > >                 return true;
> > >
> > > +       if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> > > +               kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > > +               return false;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > >         if (unlikely((void *)addr <
> > >                 kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
> > >                 kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > > index 36c645939bc9..ae9596210394 100644
> > > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > > @@ -107,6 +107,13 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct
> > > kasan_access_info *info)
> > >
> > >  const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > >  {
> > > +       /*
> > > +        * if access_size < 0, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > > +        * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > > +        */
> > > +       if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> > > +               return "out-of-bounds";
> >
> > "out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. So saying
> > "out-of-bounds" has downsides of both approaches and won't prevent
> > duplicate reports by syzbot...
> >
> maybe i should add your comment into the comment in get_bug_type?

Yes, that's exactly what I meant above:

"I would change get_bug_type() to return "slab-out-of-bounds" (as the
most common OOB) in such case (with a comment)."

 ;)

> > > +
> > >         if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr))
> > >                 return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
> > >         return get_wild_bug_type(info);
> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> > > index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644
> > > --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> > > @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t
> > > size, bool write,
> > >         if (unlikely(size == 0))
> > >                 return true;
> > >
> > > +       if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> > > +               kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > > +               return false;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > >         tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
> > >
> > >         /*
> > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> > > index 969ae08f59d7..1e1ca81214b5 100644
> > > --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> > > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> > > @@ -36,6 +36,13 @@
> > >
> > >  const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > >  {
> > > +       /*
> > > +        * if access_size < 0, then it will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > > +        * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > > +        */
> > > +       if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> > > +               return "out-of-bounds";
> > > +
> > >  #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
> > >         struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
> > >         struct kmem_cache *cache;

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