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Message-ID: <1570438317.4686.44.camel@mtksdccf07>
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 16:51:57 +0800
From: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
CC: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@...il.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
<linux-mediatek@...ts.infradead.org>,
wsd_upstream <wsd_upstream@...iatek.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kasan: fix the missing underflow in memmove and memcpy
with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
On Mon, 2019-10-07 at 10:24 +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 10:18 AM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com> wrote:
> > The patchsets help to produce KASAN report when size is negative numbers
> > in memory operation function. It is helpful for programmer to solve the
> > undefined behavior issue. Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
> > suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.
> >
> > [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
> > [2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/
> >
> > Walter Wu (2):
> > kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function
> > kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove
> >
> > lib/test_kasan.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> > mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++-----
> > mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 +++++
> > mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> > mm/kasan/tags.c | 5 +++++
> > mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> > 6 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > commit 5b3b68660b3d420fd2bd792f2d9fd3ccb8877ef7
> > Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> > Date: Fri Oct 4 18:38:31 2019 +0800
> >
> > kasan: detect invalid size in memory operation function
> >
> > It is an undefined behavior to pass a negative numbers to
> > memset()/memcpy()/memmove()
> > , so need to be detected by KASAN.
> >
> > If size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons to be defined
> > as out-of-bounds bug type.
> > 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a
> > large
> > size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this
> > can
> > qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate reports
> > by
> > some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> >
> > KASAN report:
> >
> > BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
> > Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task
> > cat/72
> >
> > CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted
> > 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
> > Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
> > Call trace:
> > dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
> > show_stack+0x14/0x20
> > dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
> > print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
> > __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
> > kasan_report+0xc/0x18
> > check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
> > memmove+0x34/0x88
> > kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
> >
> > [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> > Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> > Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index 6814d6d6a023..6ef0abd27f06 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
> > #undef memset
> > void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
> > {
> > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > + return NULL;
> >
> > return __memset(addr, c, len);
> > }
> > @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
> > #undef memmove
> > void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> > {
> > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
> > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > + return NULL;
> >
> > return __memmove(dest, src, len);
> > }
> > @@ -119,8 +121,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t
> > len)
> > #undef memcpy
> > void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> > {
> > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
> > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
> > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
> > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_))
> > + return NULL;
> >
> > return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
> > }
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> > @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool
> > check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
> > if (unlikely(size == 0))
> > return true;
> >
> > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > +
> > if (unlikely((void *)addr <
> > kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
> > kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > index 36c645939bc9..ed0eb94cb811 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
> > @@ -107,6 +107,18 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct
> > kasan_access_info *info)
> >
> > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > {
> > + /*
> > + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
> > + * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
> > + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
> > + * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > + * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
> > reports
> > + * by some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> > + */
> > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> > + return "out-of-bounds";
>
> "out-of-bounds" is the _least_ frequent KASAN bug type. It won't
> prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the frequent one.
/*
* If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
* to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
* 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
* a "large" size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
* so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
* 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
reports
* by some systems, e.g. syzbot. "out-of-bounds" is the _least_
frequent KASAN bug type.
* It won't prevent duplicates. "heap-out-of-bounds" is the
frequent one.
*/
We directly add it into the comment.
>
> > if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr))
> > return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
> > return get_wild_bug_type(info);
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> > index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> > @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t
> > size, bool write,
> > if (unlikely(size == 0))
> > return true;
> >
> > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) {
> > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > +
> > tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
> >
> > /*
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> > index 969ae08f59d7..012fbe3a793f 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
> > @@ -36,6 +36,18 @@
> >
> > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> > {
> > + /*
> > + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has two reasons
> > + * to be defined as out-of-bounds bug type.
> > + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
> > + * a 'large' size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
> > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
> > + * 2) Don't generate new bug type in order to prevent duplicate
> > reports
> > + * by some systems, e.g. syzbot.
> > + */
> > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0)
> > + return "out-of-bounds";
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
> > struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
> > struct kmem_cache *cache;
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > commit fb5cf7bd16e939d1feef229af0211a8616c9ea03
> > Author: Walter-zh Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> > Date: Fri Oct 4 18:32:03 2019 +0800
> >
> > kasan: add test for invalid size in memmove
> >
> > Test size is negative vaule in memmove in order to verify
> > if it correctly get KASAN report.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> > index 49cc4d570a40..06942cf585cc 100644
> > --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> > +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> > @@ -283,6 +283,23 @@ static noinline void __init
> > kmalloc_oob_in_memset(void)
> > kfree(ptr);
> > }
> >
> > +static noinline void __init kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size(void)
> > +{
> > + char *ptr;
> > + size_t size = 64;
> > +
> > + pr_info("invalid size in memmove\n");
> > + ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!ptr) {
> > + pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > + memset((char *)ptr, 0, 64);
> > + memmove((char *)ptr, (char *)ptr + 4, -2);
> > + kfree(ptr);
> > +}
> > +
> > static noinline void __init kmalloc_uaf(void)
> > {
> > char *ptr;
> > @@ -773,6 +790,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void)
> > kmalloc_oob_memset_4();
> > kmalloc_oob_memset_8();
> > kmalloc_oob_memset_16();
> > + kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size();
> > kmalloc_uaf();
> > kmalloc_uaf_memset();
> > kmalloc_uaf2();
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
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> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@...glegroups.com.
> > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/1570436289.4686.40.camel%40mtksdccf07.
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