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Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2019 14:56:51 +0800
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Cc: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 7/7] KVM: x86: Add user-space access interface for CET
MSRs
On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 01:57:50PM -0700, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 7:17 PM Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com> wrote:
> >
> > There're two different places storing Guest CET states, the states
> > managed with XSAVES/XRSTORS, as restored/saved
> > in previous patch, can be read/write directly from/to the MSRs.
> > For those stored in VMCS fields, they're access via vmcs_read/
> > vmcs_write.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index 44913e4ab558..5265db7cd2af 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -1671,6 +1671,49 @@ static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > +static int check_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>
> I'd suggest changing return type to bool, since you are essentially
> returning true or false.
>
Sure, will change it.
> > +{
> > + u64 kvm_xss = kvm_supported_xss();
> > +
> > + switch (msr_info->index) {
> > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP:
> > + if (!(kvm_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL))
> '|' should be '&'
Oops, thanks for the capture!
> > + return 1;
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > + return 1;
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> > + if (!(kvm_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER))
> '|' should be '&'
> > + return 1;
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > + return 1;
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> > + if (!(kvm_xss | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER))
> '|' should be '&'
> > + return 1;
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> > + return 1;
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> > + return 1;
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> > + if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > + return 1;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + return 1;
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > /*
> > * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'.
> > * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
> > @@ -1788,6 +1831,26 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > else
> > msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
> Have we ensured that this VMCS field exists?
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> > + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
> Have we ensured that this VMCS field exists?
If host kernel sets correct info, we can make sure here.
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> Can this be lumped together with MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, below?
Unfortunately, this MSR is not adjacent to below MSRs.
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_info->data);
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> > + rdmsrl(msr_info->index, msr_info->data);
> > + break;
> > case MSR_TSC_AUX:
> > if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
> > @@ -2039,6 +2102,26 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > else
> > vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> Bits 9:6 must be zero.
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, data);
> Have we ensured that this VMCS field exists?
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> Must be canonical. vCPU must support longmode.
> > + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, data);
> Have we ensured that this VMCS field exists?
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> Bits 9:6 must be zero.
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, data);
> > + break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> > + if (check_cet_msr(vcpu, msr_info))
> > + return 1;
> 'Data' must be canonical and 4-byte aligned. High dword must be zero
> on vCPUs that don't support longmode.
Thanks a lot for all above captures, will add sanity checks in next
version.
> > + wrmsrl(msr_info->index, data);
> > + break;
> > case MSR_TSC_AUX:
> > if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> > !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
> > --
> > 2.17.2
> >
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