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Message-ID: <20191016151643.GC46264@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com>
Date:   Wed, 16 Oct 2019 16:16:43 +0100
From:   Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To:     Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc:     akiyks@...il.com, stern@...land.harvard.edu, glider@...gle.com,
        parri.andrea@...il.com, andreyknvl@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org, arnd@...db.de, boqun.feng@...il.com,
        bp@...en8.de, dja@...ens.net, dlustig@...dia.com,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
        dvyukov@...gle.com, hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com,
        j.alglave@....ac.uk, joel@...lfernandes.org, corbet@....net,
        jpoimboe@...hat.com, luc.maranget@...ia.fr, npiggin@...il.com,
        paulmck@...ux.ibm.com, peterz@...radead.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
        will@...nel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/8] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer
 infrastructure

On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 10:39:52AM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 2c2e56bd8913..34a1d9310304 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -1171,6 +1171,13 @@ struct task_struct {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
>  	unsigned int			kasan_depth;
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
> +	/* See comments at kernel/kcsan/core.c: struct cpu_state. */
> +	int				kcsan_disable;
> +	int				kcsan_atomic_next;
> +	int				kcsan_atomic_region;
> +	bool				kcsan_atomic_region_flat;
> +#endif

Should these be unsigned?

> +/*
> + * Per-CPU state that should be used instead of 'current' if we are not in a
> + * task.
> + */
> +struct cpu_state {
> +	int disable; /* disable counter */
> +	int atomic_next; /* number of following atomic ops */
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * We use separate variables to store if we are in a nestable or flat
> +	 * atomic region. This helps make sure that an atomic region with
> +	 * nesting support is not suddenly aborted when a flat region is
> +	 * contained within. Effectively this allows supporting nesting flat
> +	 * atomic regions within an outer nestable atomic region. Support for
> +	 * this is required as there are cases where a seqlock reader critical
> +	 * section (flat atomic region) is contained within a seqlock writer
> +	 * critical section (nestable atomic region), and the "mismatching
> +	 * kcsan_end_atomic()" warning would trigger otherwise.
> +	 */
> +	int atomic_region;
> +	bool atomic_region_flat;
> +};
> +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_state, this_state) = {
> +	.disable = 0,
> +	.atomic_next = 0,
> +	.atomic_region = 0,
> +	.atomic_region_flat = 0,
> +};

These are the same as in task_struct, so I think it probably makes sense
to have a common structure for these, e.g.

| struct kcsan_ctx {
| 	int	disable;
| 	int	atomic_next;
| 	int	atomic_region;
| 	bool	atomic_region_flat;
| };

... which you then place within task_struct, e.g.

| #ifdef CONFIG_KCSAN
| 	struct kcsan_ctx	kcsan_ctx;
| #endif

... and here, e.g.

| static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcsan_ctx, kcsan_cpu_ctx);

That would simplify a number of cases below where you have to choose one
or the other, as you can choose the pointer, then handle the rest in a
common way.

e.g. for:

> +static inline bool is_atomic(const volatile void *ptr)
> +{
> +	if (in_task()) {
> +		if (unlikely(current->kcsan_atomic_next > 0)) {
> +			--current->kcsan_atomic_next;
> +			return true;
> +		}
> +		if (unlikely(current->kcsan_atomic_region > 0 ||
> +			     current->kcsan_atomic_region_flat))
> +			return true;
> +	} else { /* interrupt */
> +		if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(this_state.atomic_next) > 0)) {
> +			this_cpu_dec(this_state.atomic_next);
> +			return true;
> +		}
> +		if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(this_state.atomic_region) > 0 ||
> +			     this_cpu_read(this_state.atomic_region_flat)))
> +			return true;
> +	}
> +
> +	return kcsan_is_atomic(ptr);
> +}

... you could have something like:

| struct kcsan_ctx *kcsan_get_ctx(void)
| {
| 	return in_task() ? &current->kcsan_ctx : this_cpu_ptr(kcsan_cpu_ctx);
| }
|
| static inline bool is_atomic(const volatile void *ptr)
| {
| 	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = kcsan_get_ctx();
|	if (unlikely(ctx->atomic_next > 0) {
|		--ctx->atomic_next;
| 		return true;
| 	}
| 	if (unlikely(ctx->atomic_region > 0 || ctx->atomic_region_flat))
| 		return true;
|
| 	return kcsan_is_atomic(ptr);
| }

... avoiding duplicating the checks for task/irq contexts.

It's not clear to me how either that or the original code works if a
softirq is interrupted by a hardirq. IIUC most of the fields should
remain stable over that window, since the hardirq should balance most
changes it makes before returning, but I don't think that's true for
atomic_next. Can't that be corrupted from the PoV of the softirq
handler?

[...]

> +void kcsan_begin_atomic(bool nest)
> +{
> +	if (nest) {
> +		if (in_task())
> +			++current->kcsan_atomic_region;
> +		else
> +			this_cpu_inc(this_state.atomic_region);
> +	} else {
> +		if (in_task())
> +			current->kcsan_atomic_region_flat = true;
> +		else
> +			this_cpu_write(this_state.atomic_region_flat, true);
> +	}
> +}

Assuming my suggestion above wasn't bogus, this can be:

| void kcsan_begin_atomic(boot nest)
| {
| 	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = kcsan_get_ctx();
| 	if (nest)
| 		ctx->atomic_region++;
| 	else
| 		ctx->atomic_region_flat = true;
| }

> +void kcsan_end_atomic(bool nest)
> +{
> +	if (nest) {
> +		int prev =
> +			in_task() ?
> +				current->kcsan_atomic_region-- :
> +				(this_cpu_dec_return(this_state.atomic_region) +
> +				 1);
> +		if (prev == 0) {
> +			kcsan_begin_atomic(true); /* restore to 0 */
> +			kcsan_disable_current();
> +			WARN(1, "mismatching %s", __func__);
> +			kcsan_enable_current();
> +		}
> +	} else {
> +		if (in_task())
> +			current->kcsan_atomic_region_flat = false;
> +		else
> +			this_cpu_write(this_state.atomic_region_flat, false);
> +	}
> +}

... similarly:

| void kcsan_end_atomic(bool nest)
| {
| 	struct kcsan_ctx *ctx = kcsan_get_ctx();
| 
| 	if (nest)
| 		if (ctx->kcsan_atomic_region--) {
| 			kcsan_begin_atomic(true); /* restore to 0 */
| 			kcsan_disable_current();
| 			WARN(1, "mismatching %s"\ __func__);
| 			kcsan_enable_current();
| 		}
| 	} else {
| 		ctx->atomic_region_flat = true;
| 	}
| }

> +void kcsan_atomic_next(int n)
> +{
> +	if (in_task())
> +		current->kcsan_atomic_next = n;
> +	else
> +		this_cpu_write(this_state.atomic_next, n);
> +}

... and:

| void kcsan_atomic_nextint n)
| {
| 	kcsan_get_ctx()->atomic_next = n;
| }

Thanks,
Mark.

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