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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1910161142560.2046@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 11:47:03 +0200 (CEST)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
H Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>,
Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@...el.com>,
Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
x86 <x86@...nel.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 09/17] x86/split_lock: Handle #AC exception for split
lock
On Wed, 16 Oct 2019, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 25/09/19 20:09, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > - Remove KVM loading of MSR_TEST_CTRL, i.e. KVM *never* writes the CPU's
> > actual MSR_TEST_CTRL. KVM still emulates MSR_TEST_CTRL so that the
> > guest can do WRMSR and handle its own #AC faults, but KVM doesn't
> > change the value in hardware.
> >
> > * Allowing guest to enable split-lock detection can induce #AC on
> > the host after it has been explicitly turned off, e.g. the sibling
> > hyperthread hits an #AC in the host kernel, or worse, causes a
> > different process in the host to SIGBUS.
> >
> > * Allowing guest to disable split-lock detection opens up the host
> > to DoS attacks.
> >
> > - KVM advertises split-lock detection to guest/userspace if and only if
> > split_lock_detect_disabled is zero.
> >
> > - Add a pr_warn_once() in KVM that triggers if split locks are disabled
> > after support has been advertised to a guest.
> >
> > Does this sound sane?
>
> Not really, unfortunately. Just never advertise split-lock detection to
> guests. If the host has enabled split-lock detection, trap #AC and
> forward it to the host handler---which would disable split lock
> detection globally and reenter the guest.
Which completely defeats the purpose.
1) Sane guest
Guest kernel has #AC handler and you basically prevent it from detecting
malicious user space and killing it. You also prevent #AC detection in
the guest kernel which limits debugability.
2) Malicious guest
Trigger #AC to disable the host detection and then carry out the DoS
attack.
Try again.
Thanks,
tglx
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