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Message-ID: <CAE=Ncrb_7wQsv0_EvZWe5-WA2UU_GywgfnVo7hC-FDTY6bzpFQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 14:16:20 +0300
From: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
David Safford <david.safford@...com>,
Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@...imatrix.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tpm: Salt tpm_get_random() result with get_random_bytes()
On Wed, Oct 16, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jarkko Sakkinen
<jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> > > get_random_bytes(). TPM could have a bug (making results predicatable),
> > > backdoor or even an inteposer in the bus. Salting gives protections
> > > against these concerns.
> >
> > The current issue in the randomness from my point of view is that
> > encrypted filesystems, ima etc in common deployments require high
> > quality entropy just few seconds after the system has powered on for
> > the first time. It is likely that people want to keep their keys
> > device specific, so the keys need to be generated on the first boot
> > before any of the filesystems mount.
>
> This patch does not have the described issue.
My understanding was that you wanted to make the tpm_get_random() an
alternative to get_random_bytes(), and one reason why one might want
to do this is to work around the issues in get_random_bytes() in early
init as it may not be properly seeded. But sure, if you this wasn't
among the problems being solved then forget it.
--
Janne
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