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Message-ID: <8808c9ac-0906-5eec-a31f-27cbec778f9c@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 21:13:04 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
H Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@...el.com>,
Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
x86 <x86@...nel.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 09/17] x86/split_lock: Handle #AC exception for split
lock
On 10/16/2019 7:26 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 16/10/19 13:23, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> KVM always traps #AC, and only advertises split-lock detection to guest
>> when the global variable split_lock_detection_enabled in host is true.
>>
>> - If guest enables #AC (CPL3 alignment check or split-lock detection
>> enabled), injecting #AC back into guest since it's supposed capable of
>> handling it.
>> - If guest doesn't enable #AC, KVM reports #AC to userspace (like other
>> unexpected exceptions), and we can print a hint in kernel, or let
>> userspace (e.g., QEMU) tell the user guest is killed because there is a
>> split-lock in guest.
>>
>> In this way, malicious guests always get killed by userspace and old
>> sane guests cannot survive as well if it causes split-lock. If we do
>> want old sane guests work we have to disable the split-lock detection
>> (through booting parameter or debugfs) in the host just the same as we
>> want to run an old and split-lock generating userspace binary.
>
> Old guests are prevalent enough that enabling split-lock detection by
> default would be a big usability issue. And even ignoring that, you
> would get the issue you describe below:
Right, whether enabling split-lock detection is made by the
administrator. The administrator is supposed to know the consequence of
enabling it. Enabling it means don't want any split-lock happens in
userspace, of course VMM softwares are under control.
>> But there is an issue that we advertise split-lock detection to guest
>> based on the value of split_lock_detection_enabled to be true in host,
>> which can be turned into false dynamically when split-lock happens in
>> host kernel.
>
> ... which means that supposedly safe guests become unsafe, and that is bad.
>
>> This causes guest's capability changes at run time and I
>> don't if there is a better way to inform guest? Maybe we need a pv
>> interface?
>
> Even a PV interface would not change the basic fact that a supposedly
> safe configuration becomes unsafe.
I don't catch you about the unsafe?
If host disables split-lock detection dynamically, then the
MST_TEST_CTL.split_lock is clear in the hardware and we can use the PV
interface to notify the guest so that guest knows it loses the
capability of split-lock detection. In this case, I think safety is
meaningless for both host and guest.
> Paolo
>
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