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Message-Id: <20191017160301.20888-3-acme@kernel.org>
Date:   Thu, 17 Oct 2019 13:02:52 -0300
From:   Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>
To:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:     Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Clark Williams <williams@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 02/11] perf evlist: Fix fix for freed id arrays

From: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>

In the earlier fix for the memory overrun of id arrays I managed to typo
the wrong event in the fix.

Of course we need to close the current event in the loop, not the
original failing event.

The same test case as in the original patch still passes.

Fixes: 7834fa948beb ("perf evlist: Fix access of freed id arrays")
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191011182140.8353-2-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>
---
 tools/perf/util/evlist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evlist.c b/tools/perf/util/evlist.c
index d277a98e62df..de79c735e441 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evlist.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evlist.c
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ struct evsel *perf_evlist__reset_weak_group(struct evlist *evsel_list,
 			is_open = false;
 		if (c2->leader == leader) {
 			if (is_open)
-				perf_evsel__close(&evsel->core);
+				perf_evsel__close(&c2->core);
 			c2->leader = c2;
 			c2->core.nr_members = 0;
 		}
-- 
2.21.0

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