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Message-ID: <20191017181709.GA5312@avx2>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2019 21:17:09 +0300
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc: syzbot <syzbot+e392f8008a294fdf8891@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
casey@...aufler-ca.com, christian@...uner.io,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, kent.overstreet@...il.com,
khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, mhocko@...e.com,
shakeelb@...gle.com, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: KCSAN: data-race in task_dump_owner / task_dump_owner
On Thu, Oct 17, 2019 at 02:56:47PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Thu, 17 Oct 2019 at 14:36, syzbot
> <syzbot+e392f8008a294fdf8891@...kaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > syzbot found the following crash on:
> >
> > HEAD commit: d724f94f x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86
> > git tree: https://github.com/google/ktsan.git kcsan
> > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17884db3600000
> > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=c0906aa620713d80
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e392f8008a294fdf8891
> > compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
> >
> > Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
> >
> > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > Reported-by: syzbot+e392f8008a294fdf8891@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> >
> > ==================================================================
> > BUG: KCSAN: data-race in task_dump_owner / task_dump_owner
> >
> > write to 0xffff8881255bb7fc of 4 bytes by task 7804 on cpu 0:
> > task_dump_owner+0xd8/0x260 fs/proc/base.c:1742
> > pid_update_inode+0x3c/0x70 fs/proc/base.c:1818
> > pid_revalidate+0x91/0xd0 fs/proc/base.c:1841
> > d_revalidate fs/namei.c:765 [inline]
> > d_revalidate fs/namei.c:762 [inline]
> > lookup_fast+0x7cb/0x7e0 fs/namei.c:1613
> > walk_component+0x6d/0xe80 fs/namei.c:1804
> > link_path_walk.part.0+0x5d3/0xa90 fs/namei.c:2139
> > link_path_walk fs/namei.c:2070 [inline]
> > path_openat+0x14f/0x3530 fs/namei.c:3532
> > do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0 fs/namei.c:3563
> > do_sys_open+0x3b3/0x4f0 fs/open.c:1089
> > __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1107 [inline]
> > __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1102 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_open+0x55/0x70 fs/open.c:1102
> > do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x2f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> >
> > write to 0xffff8881255bb7fc of 4 bytes by task 7813 on cpu 1:
> > task_dump_owner+0xd8/0x260 fs/proc/base.c:1742
> > pid_update_inode+0x3c/0x70 fs/proc/base.c:1818
> > pid_revalidate+0x91/0xd0 fs/proc/base.c:1841
> > d_revalidate fs/namei.c:765 [inline]
> > d_revalidate fs/namei.c:762 [inline]
> > lookup_fast+0x7cb/0x7e0 fs/namei.c:1613
> > walk_component+0x6d/0xe80 fs/namei.c:1804
> > lookup_last fs/namei.c:2271 [inline]
> > path_lookupat.isra.0+0x13a/0x5a0 fs/namei.c:2316
> > filename_lookup+0x145/0x2d0 fs/namei.c:2346
> > user_path_at_empty+0x4c/0x70 fs/namei.c:2606
> > user_path_at include/linux/namei.h:60 [inline]
> > vfs_statx+0xd9/0x190 fs/stat.c:187
> > vfs_stat include/linux/fs.h:3188 [inline]
> > __do_sys_newstat+0x51/0xb0 fs/stat.c:341
> > __se_sys_newstat fs/stat.c:337 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_newstat+0x3a/0x50 fs/stat.c:337
> > do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x2f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
> >
> > Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
> > CPU: 1 PID: 7813 Comm: ps Not tainted 5.3.0+ #0
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> > Google 01/01/2011
> > ==================================================================
>
> My understanding is, that for every access to /proc/<pid>,
> d_revalidate is called, and /proc-fs implementation simply says that
> pid_revalidate always revalidates by rewriting uid/gid because "owning
> task may have performed a setuid(), etc." presumably so every access
> to a /proc/<pid> entry always has the right uid/gid (in effect
> updating /proc/<pid> lazily via d_revalidate).
>
> Is it possible that one of the tasks above could be preempted after
> doing its writes to *ruid/*rgid, another thread writing some other
> values (after setuid / seteuid), and then the preempted thread seeing
> the other values? Assertion here should never fail:
> === TASK 1 ===
> | seteuid(1000);
> | seteuid(0);
> | stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", &fstat);
> | assert(fstat.st_uid == 0);
> === TASK 2 ===
> | stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", ...);
Is it the same as
pid_revalidate() snapshots (uid,gid) correctly
but writeback is done in any order?
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