linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 05/12] arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification support

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Message-ID: <20191018134024.GE27757@arm.com>
Date:   Fri, 18 Oct 2019 14:40:25 +0100
From:   Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@....com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>,
        Amit Kachhap <amit.kachhap@....com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@....com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
        Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
        Kristina Martšenko <kristina.martsenko@....com>,
        Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Sudakshina Das <sudi.das@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/12] arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification
 support

On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 12:16:03PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> [adding mm folk]
> 
> On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 06:20:15PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 04:10:29PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > On Thu, Oct 10, 2019 at 07:44:33PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> > > > +#define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arm64_validate_prot(prot, addr)
> > > > +static inline int arm64_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
> > > > +{
> > > > +	unsigned long supported = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM;
> > > > +
> > > > +	if (system_supports_bti())
> > > > +		supported |= PROT_BTI;
> > > > +
> > > > +	return (prot & ~supported) == 0;
> > > > +}
> > > 
> > > If we have this check, can we ever get into arm64_calc_vm_prot_bits()
> > > with PROT_BIT but !system_supports_bti()?
> > > 
> > > ... or can that become:
> > > 
> > > 	return (prot & PROT_BTI) ? VM_ARM64_BTI : 0;
> > 
> > We can reach this via mmap() and friends IIUC.
> > 
> > Since this function only gets called once-ish per vma I have a weak
> > preference for keeping the check here to avoid code fragility.
> > 
> > 
> > It does feel like arch_validate_prot() is supposed to be a generic gate
> > for prot flags coming into the kernel via any route though, but only the
> > mprotect() path actually uses it.
> > 
> > This function originally landed in v2.6.27 as part of the powerpc strong
> > access ordering support (PROT_SAO):
> > 
> > b845f313d78e ("mm: Allow architectures to define additional protection bits")
> > ef3d3246a0d0 ("powerpc/mm: Add Strong Access Ordering support")
> > 
> > where the mmap() path uses arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() without
> > arch_validate_prot(), just as in the current code.  powerpc's original
> > arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() does no obvious policing.
> > 
> > This might be a bug.  I can draft a patch to add it for the mmap() path
> > for people to comment on ... I can't figure out yet whether or not the
> > difference is intentional or there's some subtlety that I'm missed.
> 
> From reading those two commit messages, it looks like this was an
> oversight. I'd expect that we should apply this check for any
> user-provided prot (i.e. it should apply to both mprotect and mmap).
> 
> Ben, Andrew, does that make sense to you?
> 
> ... or was there some reason to only do this for mprotect?
> 
> Thanks,
> Mark.

For now, I'll drop a comment under the tearoff noting this outstanding
question.

The resulting behaviour is slightly odd, but doesn't seem unsafe, and
we can of course tidy it up later.  I think the risk of userspace
becoming dependent on randomly passing PROT_BTI to mprotect() even
when unsupported is low.

[...]

Cheers
---Dave