linux-kernel - Re: email as a bona fide git transport

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Date:   Sun, 20 Oct 2019 08:50:33 +0300
From:   Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@...asonboard.com>
To:     Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
Cc:     Santiago Torres Arias <santiago@....edu>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
        workflows@...r.kernel.org, Git Mailing List <git@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Eric Wong <e@...24.org>
Subject: Re: email as a bona fide git transport

On Thu, Oct 17, 2019 at 06:30:29PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 17, 2019 at 04:45:32PM -0400, Konstantin Ryabitsev wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 17, 2019 at 01:43:43PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
> >>> I wonder if it'd be also possible to then embed gpg signatures over
> >>> send-mail payloads so as they can be transparently transferred to the
> >>> commit.
> >> 
> >> That's a crazy idea.  It would be nice if we could do that, I like it :)
> > 
> > It could only possibly work if nobody ever adds their own "Signed-Off-By" or
> > any other bylines. I expect this is a deal-breaker for most maintainers.
> 
> Yeah it is :(
> 
> But, if we could just have the signature on the code change, not the
> changelog text, that would help with that issue.

I ran into a related issue recently when thinking about how to implement
server-side workflows (for a non-kernel project). My goal is to ensure a
patch can only be pushed to the master branch if it has received review.
The easy way to do so it to check the Reviewed-by tags, but those can
easily be forged. I was thus wondering if we should have a way to sign
tags (as in commit message tags, not git tags).

-- 
Regards,

Laurent Pinchart