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Message-Id: <20191022133855.B1B4752050@d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 19:08:54 +0530
From: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, wugyuan@...ibm.com,
jlayton@...nel.org, hsiangkao@....com, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] vfs: Really check for inode ptr in lookup_fast
I think we have still not taken this patch. Al?
On 10/15/19 9:37 AM, Ritesh Harjani wrote:
> ping!!
>
> On 9/27/19 10:12 AM, Ritesh Harjani wrote:
>> d_is_negative can race with d_instantiate_new()
>> -> __d_set_inode_and_type().
>> For e.g. in use cases where Thread-1 is creating
>> symlink (doing d_instantiate_new()) & Thread-2 is doing
>> cat of that symlink while doing lookup_fast (via REF-walk-
>> one such case is, when ->permission returns -ECHILD).
>>
>> During this race if __d_set_and_inode_type() does out-of-order
>> execution and set the dentry->d_flags before setting
>> dentry->inode, then it can result into following kernel panic.
>>
>> This change fixes the issue by directly checking for inode.
>>
>> E.g. kernel panic, since inode was NULL.
>> trailing_symlink() -> may_follow_link() -> inode->i_uid.
>> Issue signature:-
>> [NIP : trailing_symlink+80]
>> [LR : trailing_symlink+1092]
>> #4 [c00000198069bb70] trailing_symlink at c0000000004bae60
>> (unreliable)
>> #5 [c00000198069bc00] path_openat at c0000000004bdd14
>> #6 [c00000198069bc90] do_filp_open at c0000000004c0274
>> #7 [c00000198069bdb0] do_sys_open at c00000000049b248
>> #8 [c00000198069be30] system_call at c00000000000b388
>>
>> Sequence of events:-
>> Thread-2(Comm: ln) Thread-1(Comm: cat)
>>
>> dentry = __d_lookup() //nonRCU
>>
>> __d_set_and_inode_type() (Out-of-order execution)
>> flags = READ_ONCE(dentry->d_flags);
>> flags &= ~(DCACHE_ENTRY_TYPE | DCACHE_FALLTHRU);
>> flags |= type_flags;
>> WRITE_ONCE(dentry->d_flags, flags);
>>
>> if (unlikely(d_is_negative()) // fails
>> {}
>> // since d_flags is already updated in
>> // Thread-2 in parallel but inode
>> // not yet set.
>> // d_is_negative returns false
>>
>> *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
>> // means inode is still NULL
>>
>> dentry->d_inode = inode;
>>
>> trailing_symlink()
>> may_follow_link()
>> inode = nd->link_inode;
>> // nd->link_inode = NULL
>> //Then it crashes while
>> //doing inode->i_uid
>>
>> Reported-by: Guang Yuan Wu <wugyuan@...ibm.com>
>> Tested-by: Guang Yuan Wu <wugyuan@...ibm.com>
>> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@...ux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> fs/namei.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
>> index 671c3c1a3425..7c5337cddebd 100644
>> --- a/fs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/namei.c
>> @@ -1617,7 +1617,21 @@ static int lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
>> dput(dentry);
>> return status;
>> }
>> - if (unlikely(d_is_negative(dentry))) {
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Caution: d_is_negative() can race with
>> + * __d_set_inode_and_type().
>> + * For e.g. in use cases where Thread-1 is creating
>> + * symlink (doing d_instantiate_new()) & Thread-2 is doing
>> + * cat of that symlink and falling here (via Ref-walk) while
>> + * doing lookup_fast (one such case is when ->permission
>> + * returns -ECHILD).
>> + * Now if __d_set_inode_and_type() does out-of-order execution
>> + * i.e. it first sets the dentry->d_flags & then dentry->inode
>> + * then it can result into inode being NULL, causing panic later.
>> + * Hence directly check if inode is NULL here.
>> + */
>> + if (unlikely(d_really_is_negative(dentry))) {
>> dput(dentry);
>> return -ENOENT;
>> }
>>
>
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