linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/7] Add a UFFD_SECURE flag to the userfaultfd API.

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Message-ID: <CALCETrX=1XUwsuKc6dinj3ZTnrK85m_+UL=iaYKj4EZtf-xm5g@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 22 Oct 2019 21:11:04 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...tuozzo.com>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc:     Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>,
        Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
        Nosh Minwalla <nosh@...gle.com>,
        Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] Add a UFFD_SECURE flag to the userfaultfd API.

Trying again.  It looks like I used the wrong address for Pavel.

On Sat, Oct 12, 2019 at 6:14 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> [adding more people because this is going to be an ABI break, sigh]
>
> On Sat, Oct 12, 2019 at 5:52 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Oct 12, 2019 at 4:10 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Sat, Oct 12, 2019 at 12:16 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The new secure flag makes userfaultfd use a new "secure" anonymous
> > > > file object instead of the default one, letting security modules
> > > > supervise userfaultfd use.
> > > >
> > > > Requiring that users pass a new flag lets us avoid changing the
> > > > semantics for existing callers.
> > >
> > > Is there any good reason not to make this be the default?
> > >
> > >
> > > The only downside I can see is that it would increase the memory usage
> > > of userfaultfd(), but that doesn't seem like such a big deal.  A
> > > lighter-weight alternative would be to have a single inode shared by
> > > all userfaultfd instances, which would require a somewhat different
> > > internal anon_inode API.
> >
> > I'd also prefer to just make SELinux use mandatory, but there's a
> > nasty interaction with UFFD_EVENT_FORK. Adding a new UFFD_SECURE mode
> > which blocks UFFD_EVENT_FORK sidesteps this problem. Maybe you know a
> > better way to deal with it.
>
> ...
>
> > But maybe we can go further: let's separate authentication and
> > authorization, as we do in other LSM hooks. Let's split my
> > inode_init_security_anon into two hooks, inode_init_security_anon and
> > inode_create_anon. We'd define the former to just initialize the file
> > object's security information --- in the SELinux case, figuring out
> > its class and SID --- and define the latter to answer the yes/no
> > question of whether a particular anonymous inode creation should be
> > allowed. Normally, anon_inode_getfile2() would just call both hooks.
> > We'd add another anon_inode_getfd flag, ANON_INODE_SKIP_AUTHORIZATION
> > or something, that would tell anon_inode_getfile2() to skip calling
> > the authorization hook, effectively making the creation always
> > succeed. We can then make the UFFD code pass
> > ANON_INODE_SKIP_AUTHORIZATION when it's creating a file object in the
> > fork child while creating UFFD_EVENT_FORK messages.
>
> That sounds like an improvement.  Or maybe just teach SELinux that
> this particular fd creation is actually making an anon_inode that is a
> child of an existing anon inode and that the context should be copied
> or whatever SELinux wants to do.  Like this, maybe:
>
> static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
>                                   struct userfaultfd_ctx *new,
>                                   struct uffd_msg *msg)
> {
>         int fd;
>
> Change this:
>
>         fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
>                               O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS));
>
> to something like:
>
>       fd = anon_inode_make_child_fd(..., ctx->inode, ...);
>
> where ctx->inode is the one context's inode.
>
> *** HOWEVER *** !!!
>
> Now that you've pointed this mechanism out, it is utterly and
> completely broken and should be removed from the kernel outright or at
> least severely restricted.  A .read implementation MUST NOT ACT ON THE
> CALLING TASK.  Ever.  Just imagine the effect of passing a userfaultfd
> as stdin to a setuid program.
>
> So I think the right solution might be to attempt to *remove*
> UFFD_EVENT_FORK.  Maybe the solution is to say that, unless the
> creator of a userfaultfd() has global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then it cannot
> use UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK) and print a warning (once) when
> UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK is allowed.  And, after some suitable
> deprecation period, just remove it.  If it's genuinely useful, it
> needs an entirely new API based on ioctl() or a syscall.  Or even
> recvmsg() :)
>
> And UFFD_SECURE should just become automatic, since you don't have a
> problem any more. :-p
>
> --Andy