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Message-ID: <lsq.1572026582.859033438@decadent.org.uk>
Date:   Fri, 25 Oct 2019 19:03:28 +0100
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@...ux-powerpc.org>,
        hpa@...or.com, "Dianzhang Chen" <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>,
        "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>, bp@...en8.de
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 27/47] x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in
 ptrace_get_debugreg()
3.16.76-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
commit 31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415 upstream.
The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via
syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the
Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The index can be controlled from:
    ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.
Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access
thread->ptrace_bps.
Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: bp@...en8.de
Cc: hpa@...or.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: fold in fix-up from commit 223cea6a4f05
 "Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ..."]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -707,7 +708,8 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg
 	unsigned long val = 0;
 
 	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
-		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+		int index = array_index_nospec(n, HBP_NUM);
+		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index];
 
 		if (bp)
 			val = bp->hw.info.address;
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