linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.3 093/197] rxrpc: use rcu protection while reading sk->sk_user

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Message-Id: <20191027203356.781169462@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Sun, 27 Oct 2019 22:00:11 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.3 093/197] rxrpc: use rcu protection while reading sk->sk_user_data

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>

[ Upstream commit 2ca4f6ca4562594ef161e4140c2a5e0e5282967b ]

We need to extend the rcu_read_lock() section in rxrpc_error_report()
and use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() instead of plain access
to sk->sk_user_data to make sure all rules are respected.

The compiler wont reload sk->sk_user_data at will, and RCU rules
prevent memory beeing freed too soon.

Fixes: f0308fb07080 ("rxrpc: Fix possible NULL pointer access in ICMP handling")
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 net/rxrpc/peer_event.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c b/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c
index 61451281d74a3..48f67a9b1037c 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/peer_event.c
@@ -147,13 +147,16 @@ void rxrpc_error_report(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct sock_exterr_skb *serr;
 	struct sockaddr_rxrpc srx;
-	struct rxrpc_local *local = sk->sk_user_data;
+	struct rxrpc_local *local;
 	struct rxrpc_peer *peer;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
-	if (unlikely(!local))
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	local = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
+	if (unlikely(!local)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return;
-
+	}
 	_enter("%p{%d}", sk, local->debug_id);
 
 	/* Clear the outstanding error value on the socket so that it doesn't
@@ -163,6 +166,7 @@ void rxrpc_error_report(struct sock *sk)
 
 	skb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);
 	if (!skb) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		_leave("UDP socket errqueue empty");
 		return;
 	}
@@ -170,11 +174,11 @@ void rxrpc_error_report(struct sock *sk)
 	serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb);
 	if (!skb->len && serr->ee.ee_origin == SO_EE_ORIGIN_TIMESTAMPING) {
 		_leave("UDP empty message");
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_freed);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
 	peer = rxrpc_lookup_peer_icmp_rcu(local, skb, &srx);
 	if (peer && !rxrpc_get_peer_maybe(peer))
 		peer = NULL;
-- 
2.20.1