[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20191028073025.GB1944@kadam>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2019 10:30:25 +0300
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
To: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dan Carpenter <error27@...il.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
zhanglin <zhang.lin16@....com.cn>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: sys.c: Avoid copying possible padding bytes in
copy_to_user
We should be able to use memzero_explicit(), right?
The fact that we memset() can't be used to prevent information leaks has
always worried me. Everyone predicted that we would have bugs like this
where memset doesn't work as expected.
regards,
dan carpenter
Powered by blists - more mailing lists