linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings

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Date:   Tue, 29 Oct 2019 10:28:53 +0100
From:   Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To:     Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, x86@...nel.org,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user
 mappings

On Mon, Oct 28, 2019 at 11:08:08AM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 28, 2019 at 10:12:44AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > Some other random thoughts:
> > 
> >  * The page flag is probably not a good idea.  It would be probably
> >    better to set _PAGE_SPECIAL on the PTE and force get_user_pages()
> >    into the slow path.
> >  * This really stops being "normal" memory.  You can't do futexes on it,
> >    cant splice it.  Probably need a more fleshed-out list of
> >    incompatible features.
> >  * As Kirill noted, each 4k page ends up with a potential 1GB "blast
> >    radius" of demoted pages in the direct map.  Not cool.  This is
> >    probably a non-starter as it stands.
> >  * The global TLB flushes are going to eat you alive.  They probably
> >    border on a DoS on larger systems.
> >  * Do we really want this user interface to dictate the kernel
> >    implementation?  In other words, do we really want MAP_EXCLUSIVE,
> >    or do we want MAP_SECRET?  One tells the kernel what do *do*, the
> >    other tells the kernel what the memory *IS*.
> >  * There's a lot of other stuff going on in this area: XPFO, SEV, MKTME,
> >    Persistent Memory, where the kernel direct map is a liability in some
> >    way.  We probably need some kind of overall, architected solution
> >    rather than five or ten things all poking at the direct map.
> 
> Another random set of thoughts:
> 
>  - Should devices be permitted to DMA to/from MAP_SECRET pages?

I can't say I have a clear cut yes or no here. One possible use case for
such pages is to read a secrets from storage directly into them. On the
other side, DMA to/from a device can be used to exploit those secrets...

>  - How about GUP?

Do you mean GUP for "remote" memory? I'd say no.

>  - Can I ptrace my way into another process's secret pages?

No.

>  - What if I splice() the page into a pipe?

I think it should fail.

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.