linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user mappings

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Message-ID: <9eae3941-64cf-4ea1-0287-0e64bab192c6@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 30 Oct 2019 09:19:33 +0100
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, x86@...nel.org,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] mm: add MAP_EXCLUSIVE to create exclusive user
 mappings

On 30.10.19 09:15, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 12:02:34PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 27.10.19 11:17, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
>>>
>>> The mappings created with MAP_EXCLUSIVE are visible only in the context of
>>> the owning process and can be used by applications to store secret
>>> information that will not be visible not only to other processes but to the
>>> kernel as well.
>>>
>>> The pages in these mappings are removed from the kernel direct map and
>>> marked with PG_user_exclusive flag. When the exclusive area is unmapped,
>>> the pages are mapped back into the direct map.
>>>
>>
>> Just a thought, the kernel is still able to indirectly read the contents of
>> these pages by doing a kdump from kexec environment, right?
> 
> Right.
> 
>> Also, I wonder
>> what would happen if you map such pages via /dev/mem into another user space
>> application and e.g., use them along with kvm [1].
> 
> Do you mean that one application creates MAP_EXCLUSIVE and another
> applications accesses the same physical pages via /dev/mem?

Exactly.

> 
> With /dev/mem all physical memory is visible...

Okay, so the statement "information that will not be visible not only to 
other processes but to the kernel as well" is not correct. There are 
easy ways to access that information if you really want to (might 
require root permissions, though).

-- 

Thanks,

David / dhildenb