linux-kernel - [PATCH v11 3/4] fork: support VMAP_STACK with KASAN

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Message-Id: <20191031093909.9228-4-dja@axtens.net>
Date:   Thu, 31 Oct 2019 20:39:08 +1100
From:   Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>
To:     kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-mm@...ck.org, x86@...nel.org,
        aryabinin@...tuozzo.com, glider@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mark.rutland@....com,
        dvyukov@...gle.com, christophe.leroy@....fr
Cc:     linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, gor@...ux.ibm.com,
        Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>
Subject: [PATCH v11 3/4] fork: support VMAP_STACK with KASAN_VMALLOC

Supporting VMAP_STACK with KASAN_VMALLOC is straightforward:

 - clear the shadow region of vmapped stacks when swapping them in
 - tweak Kconfig to allow VMAP_STACK to be turned on with KASAN

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>
---
 arch/Kconfig  | 9 +++++----
 kernel/fork.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 5f8a5d84dbbe..2d914990402f 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -843,16 +843,17 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
 config VMAP_STACK
 	default y
 	bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
-	depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK && !KASAN
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
+	depends on !KASAN || KASAN_VMALLOC
 	---help---
 	  Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
 	  with guard pages.  This causes kernel stack overflows to be
 	  caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose
 	  corruption.
 
-	  This is presently incompatible with KASAN because KASAN expects
-	  the stack to map directly to the KASAN shadow map using a formula
-	  that is incorrect if the stack is in vmalloc space.
+	  To use this with KASAN, the architecture must support backing
+	  virtual mappings with real shadow memory, and KASAN_VMALLOC must
+	  be enabled.
 
 config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
 	def_bool n
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 4b2a82eda8e5..0eef4243019c 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -224,6 +225,9 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
 		if (!s)
 			continue;
 
+		/* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */
+		kasan_unpoison_shadow(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+
 		/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
 		memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
 
-- 
2.20.1