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Message-Id: <20191101085222.27997-3-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2019 16:52:17 +0800
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
pbonzini@...hat.com, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com
Cc: jmattson@...gle.com, yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com,
yu-cheng.yu@...el.com, Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 2/7] KVM: VMX: Define CET VMCS fields and #CP flag
CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is an upcoming Intel(R)
processor feature that blocks Return/Jump-Oriented Programming(ROP)
attacks. It provides the following capabilities to defend
against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks:
Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
A second stack for program which is used exclusively for
control transfer operations.
Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
Code branching protection to defend against jump/call oriented
programming.
Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET:
MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET: Controls the CET settings for user
mode and suervisor mode respectively.
MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointers for
CPL-0,1,2,3 level respectively.
MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: Stores base address of shadow stack
pointer table.
Two XSAVES state bits are introduced for CET:
IA32_XSS:[bit 11]: For saving/restoring user mode CET states
IA32_XSS:[bit 12]: For saving/restoring supervisor mode CET states.
Six VMCS fields are introduced for CET:
{HOST,GUEST}_S_CET: Stores CET settings for supervisor mode.
{HOST,GUEST}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointer for supervisor mode.
{HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE: Stores base address of shadow stack pointer
table.
If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host's CET MSRs are restored
from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
HOST_S_CET
HOST_SSP
HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE
If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest's CET MSRs are loaded
from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
GUEST_S_CET
GUEST_SSP
GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE
Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 5 +++--
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index a39136b0d509..68bca290a203 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS 0x00800000
#define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000
#define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000
+#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE 0x10000000
#define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff
@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000
#define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000
#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000
+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE 0x00100000
#define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff
@@ -321,6 +323,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS = 0x00006822,
GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP = 0x00006824,
GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006826,
+ GUEST_S_CET = 0x00006828,
+ GUEST_SSP = 0x0000682a,
+ GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x0000682c,
HOST_CR0 = 0x00006c00,
HOST_CR3 = 0x00006c02,
HOST_CR4 = 0x00006c04,
@@ -333,6 +338,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006c12,
HOST_RSP = 0x00006c14,
HOST_RIP = 0x00006c16,
+ HOST_S_CET = 0x00006c18,
+ HOST_SSP = 0x00006c1a,
+ HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x00006c1c
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 503d3f42da16..e68d6b448730 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#define MC_VECTOR 18
#define XM_VECTOR 19
#define VE_VECTOR 20
+#define CP_VECTOR 21
/* Select x86 specific features in <linux/kvm.h> */
#define __KVM_HAVE_PIT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 290c3c3efb87..540490d5385f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int exception_class(int vector)
case NP_VECTOR:
case SS_VECTOR:
case GP_VECTOR:
+ case CP_VECTOR:
return EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY;
default:
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index f10c12b5197d..7e7b5b5cc956 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline bool x86_exception_has_error_code(unsigned int vector)
{
static u32 exception_has_error_code = BIT(DF_VECTOR) | BIT(TS_VECTOR) |
BIT(NP_VECTOR) | BIT(SS_VECTOR) | BIT(GP_VECTOR) |
- BIT(PF_VECTOR) | BIT(AC_VECTOR);
+ BIT(PF_VECTOR) | BIT(AC_VECTOR) | BIT(CP_VECTOR);
return (1U << vector) & exception_has_error_code;
}
@@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr2,
* Right now, no XSS states are used on x86 platform,
* expand the macro for new features.
*/
-#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS 0
+#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER \
+ | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
extern u64 host_xcr0;
--
2.17.2
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