[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAKOZuev93zDGNPX+ySg_jeUg4Z3zKMcpABekUQvHA01kTVn4=A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 07:55:17 -0800
From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
Nosh Minwalla <nosh@...gle.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@...il.com>,
Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-mm <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK
On Tue, Nov 5, 2019 at 7:29 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Current implementation of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK modifies the file
> descriptor table from the read() implementation of uffd, which may have
> security implications for unprivileged use of the userfaultfd.
>
> Limit availability of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for callers that have
> CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
Thanks. But shouldn't we be doing the capability check at
userfaultfd(2) time (when we do the other permission checks), not
later, in the API ioctl?
Powered by blists - more mailing lists