linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 5 Nov 2019 11:33:16 -0500
From:   Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
To:     Daniel Colascione <dancol@...gle.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>,
        Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
        Nosh Minwalla <nosh@...gle.com>,
        Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@...il.com>,
        Tim Murray <timmurray@...gle.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-mm <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for
 UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK

On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 08:06:49AM -0800, Daniel Colascione wrote:
> Sure, but the same argument applies to all the other permission checks
> that we do at open time, not at ioctl time. For better or for worse,
> the DAC-ish model used in most places is that access checks happen at
> file object creation time and anyone who has the FD can perform those
> operations later. Confusing the model by doing *some* permission
> checks at open time and *some* permission checks at usage time makes
> the system harder to understand.

The only case that requires change is if userland requested the
UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK feature (which AFIK only CRIU does) and that
request is done in the UFFDIO_API call not during the syscall.

Doing the check in the syscall would then break all non privileged
users like if we'd set /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd to
zero. Qemu for example rightfully never runs with privilege (with a
few exceptions like Kata which should be fixed in fact) and it never
asks for the UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK feature either.