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Message-ID: <87h83g568t.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2019 21:29:54 +1100
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
To: Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Cc: benh@...nel.crashing.org, david@...son.dropbear.id.au,
paulus@...abs.org, mdroth@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, hch@....de,
linuxram@...ibm.com, andmike@...ibm.com,
sukadev@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mst@...hat.com, ram.n.pai@...il.com,
aik@...abs.ru, cai@....pw, tglx@...utronix.de,
bauerman@...ux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v1 1/2] powerpc/pseries/iommu: Share the per-cpu TCE page with the hypervisor.
Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com> writes:
> The hypervisor needs to access the contents of the page holding the TCE
> entries while setting up the TCE entries in the IOMMU's TCE table. For
> SecureVMs, since this page is encrypted, the hypervisor cannot access
> valid entries. Share the page with the hypervisor. This ensures that the
> hypervisor sees the valid entries.
Can you please give people some explanation of why this is safe. After
all the point of the Ultravisor is to protect the guest from a malicious
hypervisor. Giving the hypervisor access to a page of TCEs sounds
dangerous, so please explain why it's not.
cheers
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
> index 8d9c2b1..07f0847 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c
> @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
> #include <asm/mmzone.h>
> #include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
> #include <asm/svm.h>
> +#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
>
> #include "pseries.h"
>
> @@ -179,6 +180,19 @@ static int tce_build_pSeriesLP(struct iommu_table *tbl, long tcenum,
>
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__be64 *, tce_page);
>
> +/*
> + * Allocate a tce page. If secure VM, share the page with the hypervisor.
> + */
> +static __be64 *alloc_tce_page(void)
> +{
> + __be64 *tcep = (__be64 *)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
> +
> + if (tcep && is_secure_guest())
> + uv_share_page(PHYS_PFN(__pa(tcep)), 1);
> +
> + return tcep;
> +}
> +
> static int tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(struct iommu_table *tbl, long tcenum,
> long npages, unsigned long uaddr,
> enum dma_data_direction direction,
> @@ -206,8 +220,7 @@ static int tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(struct iommu_table *tbl, long tcenum,
> * from iommu_alloc{,_sg}()
> */
> if (!tcep) {
> - tcep = (__be64 *)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
> - /* If allocation fails, fall back to the loop implementation */
> + tcep = alloc_tce_page();
> if (!tcep) {
> local_irq_restore(flags);
> return tce_build_pSeriesLP(tbl, tcenum, npages, uaddr,
> @@ -391,6 +404,7 @@ static int tce_clearrange_multi_pSeriesLP(unsigned long start_pfn,
> return rc;
> }
>
> +
> static int tce_setrange_multi_pSeriesLP(unsigned long start_pfn,
> unsigned long num_pfn, const void *arg)
> {
> @@ -405,7 +419,7 @@ static int tce_setrange_multi_pSeriesLP(unsigned long start_pfn,
> tcep = __this_cpu_read(tce_page);
>
> if (!tcep) {
> - tcep = (__be64 *)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
> + tcep = alloc_tce_page();
> if (!tcep) {
> local_irq_enable();
> return -ENOMEM;
> --
> 1.8.3.1
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