linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 58/75] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

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Date:   Fri,  8 Nov 2019 19:50:15 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "linus.walleij@...aro.org, rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk, Ard Biesheuvel" 
        <ardb@...nel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Russell King <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>,
        "David A. Long" <dave.long@...aro.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 58/75] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>

Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream.

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:

	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
	access(base + index * stride);

In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
loaded.  On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.

The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.

Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access.  This
also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
by a subsequent access.

Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer.  This prevents get_user() being
used as the load() step above.  As a side effect, put_user() will also
be affected even though it isn't implicated.

Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@...aro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h |    4 ++++
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S    |    9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -454,6 +454,10 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 	adds	\tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
 	sbcccs	\tmp, \tmp, \limit
 	bcs	\bad
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	movcs	\addr, #0
+	csdb
+#endif
 #endif
 	.endm

--- a/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
@@ -90,6 +90,15 @@
 	.text

 ENTRY(arm_copy_from_user)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	get_thread_info r3
+	ldr	r3, [r3, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
+	adds	ip, r1, r2	@ ip=addr+size
+	sub	r3, r3, #1	@ addr_limit - 1
+	cmpcc	ip, r3		@ if (addr+size > addr_limit - 1)
+	movcs	r1, #0		@ addr = NULL
+	csdb
+#endif

 #include "copy_template.S"