linux-kernel - [PATCH 2/3] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP

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Date:   Tue, 12 Nov 2019 22:10:01 +0100
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        jannh@...gle.com
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP

A frequent cause of #GP exceptions are memory accesses to non-canonical
addresses. Unlike #PF, #GP doesn't come with a fault address in CR2, so
the kernel doesn't currently print the fault address for #GP.
Luckily, we already have the necessary infrastructure for decoding X86
instructions and computing the memory address that is being accessed;
hook it up to the #GP handler so that we can figure out whether the #GP
looks like it was caused by a non-canonical address, and if so, print
that address.

While it is already possible to compute the faulting address manually by
disassembling the opcode dump and evaluating the instruction against the
register dump, this should make it slightly easier to identify crashes
at a glance.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index c90312146da0..479cfc6e9507 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
 #include <asm/vm86.h>
 #include <asm/umip.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
+#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -509,6 +511,42 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 	do_trap(X86_TRAP_BR, SIGSEGV, "bounds", regs, error_code, 0, NULL);
 }
 
+/*
+ * On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical
+ * address, print that address.
+ */
+static void print_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	u8 insn_bytes[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+	struct insn insn;
+	unsigned long addr_ref;
+
+	if (probe_kernel_read(insn_bytes, (void *)regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE))
+		return;
+
+	kernel_insn_init(&insn, insn_bytes, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
+	insn_get_modrm(&insn);
+	insn_get_sib(&insn);
+	addr_ref = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
+
+	/*
+	 * If insn_get_addr_ref() failed or we got a canonical address in the
+	 * kernel half, bail out.
+	 */
+	if ((addr_ref | __VIRTUAL_MASK) == ~0UL)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * For the user half, check against TASK_SIZE_MAX; this way, if the
+	 * access crosses the canonical address boundary, we don't miss it.
+	 */
+	if (addr_ref <= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+		return;
+
+	pr_alert("dereferencing non-canonical address 0x%016lx\n", addr_ref);
+#endif
+}
+
 dotraplinkage void
 do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 {
@@ -547,8 +585,11 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 			return;
 
 		if (notify_die(DIE_GPF, desc, regs, error_code,
-			       X86_TRAP_GP, SIGSEGV) != NOTIFY_STOP)
-			die(desc, regs, error_code);
+			       X86_TRAP_GP, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
+			return;
+
+		print_kernel_gp_address(regs);
+		die(desc, regs, error_code);
 		return;
 	}
 
-- 
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog