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Message-ID: <201911121514.DA3BEED0@keescook>
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 15:15:15 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)"
<linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Allow restricting permissions in /proc/sys
On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 12:56:48PM -0500, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 03, 2019 at 04:55:48PM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> > Several items in /proc/sys need not be accessible to unprivileged
> > tasks. Let the system administrator change the permissions, but only
> > to more restrictive modes than what the sysctl tables allow.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
>
> Why should restruct the system administrator from changing the
> permissions to one which is more lax than what the sysctl tables?
>
> The system administrator is already very much trusted. Why should we
> take that discretion away from the system administrator?
Generally speaking, they're there to provide some sense of boundary
between uid 0 and the kernel proper. I think it's correct to not allow
weakening of these permissions (which is the current state: no change at
all).
--
Kees Cook
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