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Message-ID: <C365EA60-3A23-4C39-B21C-2CBC0B450E3C@alien8.de>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 21:21:45 +0100
From: Boris Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
CC: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation status
On November 15, 2019 8:35:54 PM GMT+01:00, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
>See the last sentence of the paragraph you replied to :)
Proves even more that this should be documented in *all* places that talk about TAA cmdline options and we should not rely on references but write stuff out everywhere so that people can see it directly.
>But serioulsy, yes we should mention the interaction in
>kernel-parameters.txt as well. Something like:
>
> off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation.
>+ On TAA affected machines, mds=off can be prevented
>+ by an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities
>+ are mitigated with the same mechanism.
>
>and the other way round for TAA.
Ack.
Thx.
--
Sent from a small device: formatting sux and brevity is inevitable.
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