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Message-ID: <20191118231343.GA231930@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 18 Nov 2019 15:13:43 -0800
From:   Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
To:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
        Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@...il.com>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
        clang-built-linux <clang-built-linux@...glegroups.com>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 14/14] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack

On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 12:19:20PM -0800, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2019 at 7:20 AM Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 03:56:08PM -0800, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> > > This change implements shadow stack switching, initial SCS set-up,
> > > and interrupt shadow stacks for arm64.
> >
> > Each CPU also has an overflow stack, and two SDEI stacks, which should
> > presumably be given their own SCS. SDEI is effectively a software-NMI,
> > so it should almost certainly have the same treatement as IRQ.
> 
> Makes sense. I'll take a look at adding shadow stacks for the SDEI handler.

Mark, I wrote a preliminary patch for adding SDEI shadow stacks, but
turns out I don't really have a way to test the SDEI code. Does the approach
below look sane to you?

Sami


---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h        |   2 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h |   4 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S           |  14 +++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c             | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c            |   7 ++
 5 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
index c50d2b0c6c5f..8e327e14bc15 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
 
 extern void scs_init_irq(void);
+extern int scs_init_sdei(void);
 
 static __always_inline void scs_save(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ static inline void scs_overflow_check(struct task_struct *tsk)
 #else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
 
 static inline void scs_init_irq(void) {}
+static inline int scs_init_sdei(void) { return 0; }
 static inline void scs_save(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
 static inline void scs_overflow_check(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h
index b6cf32fb4efe..4d9b1f48dc39 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stacktrace.h
@@ -68,10 +68,6 @@ extern void dump_backtrace(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *tsk);
 
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, irq_stack_ptr);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, irq_shadow_call_stack_ptr);
-#endif
-
 static inline bool on_irq_stack(unsigned long sp,
 				struct stack_info *info)
 {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 5a02b61fc3e6..ac9dfb3da440 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -1309,13 +1309,16 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_handler)
 
 	mov	x19, x1
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)
+	ldrb	w4, [x19, #SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY]
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
 	/*
 	 * entry.S may have been using sp as a scratch register, find whether
 	 * this is a normal or critical event and switch to the appropriate
 	 * stack for this CPU.
 	 */
-	ldrb	w4, [x19, #SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY]
 	cbnz	w4, 1f
 	ldr_this_cpu dst=x5, sym=sdei_stack_normal_ptr, tmp=x6
 	b	2f
@@ -1325,6 +1328,15 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_handler)
 	mov	sp, x5
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	/* Use a separate shadow call stack for normal and critical events */
+	cbnz	w4, 3f
+	ldr_this_cpu dst=x18, sym=sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal_ptr, tmp=x6
+	b	4f
+3:	ldr_this_cpu dst=x18, sym=sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical_ptr, tmp=x6
+4:
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * We may have interrupted userspace, or a guest, or exit-from or
 	 * return-to either of these. We can't trust sp_el0, restore it.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
index 9a1305a6eb5b..dddb7c56518b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c
@@ -10,31 +10,105 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/scs.h>
 
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, irq_shadow_call_stack_ptr);
+#define DECLARE_SCS(name)						\
+	DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, name ## _ptr);			\
+	DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [SCS_SIZE/sizeof(long)], name)
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [SCS_SIZE/sizeof(long)], irq_shadow_call_stack)
-	__aligned(SCS_SIZE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP
+#define DEFINE_SCS(name)						\
+	DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, name ## _ptr)
+#else
+/* Allocate a static per-CPU shadow stack */
+#define DEFINE_SCS(name)						\
+	DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long *, name ## _ptr);			\
+	DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [SCS_SIZE/sizeof(long)], name)	\
+		__aligned(SCS_SIZE)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP */
+
+DECLARE_SCS(irq_shadow_call_stack);
+DECLARE_SCS(sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal);
+DECLARE_SCS(sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical);
+
+DEFINE_SCS(irq_shadow_call_stack);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
+DEFINE_SCS(sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal);
+DEFINE_SCS(sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical);
 #endif
 
+static int scs_alloc_percpu(unsigned long * __percpu *ptr, int cpu)
+{
+	unsigned long *p;
+
+	p = __vmalloc_node_range(PAGE_SIZE, SCS_SIZE,
+				 VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END,
+				 GFP_SCS, PAGE_KERNEL,
+				 0, cpu_to_node(cpu),
+				 __builtin_return_address(0));
+
+	if (!p)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	per_cpu(*ptr, cpu) = p;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void scs_free_percpu(unsigned long * __percpu *ptr, int cpu)
+{
+	unsigned long *p = per_cpu(*ptr, cpu);
+
+	if (p) {
+		per_cpu(*ptr, cpu) = NULL;
+		vfree(p);
+	}
+}
+
+static void scs_free_sdei(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		scs_free_percpu(&sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal_ptr, cpu);
+		scs_free_percpu(&sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical_ptr, cpu);
+	}
+}
+
 void scs_init_irq(void)
 {
 	int cpu;
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP
-		unsigned long *p;
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP))
+			WARN_ON(scs_alloc_percpu(&irq_shadow_call_stack_ptr,
+						 cpu));
+		else
+			per_cpu(irq_shadow_call_stack_ptr, cpu) =
+				per_cpu(irq_shadow_call_stack, cpu);
+	}
+}
 
-		p = __vmalloc_node_range(SCS_SIZE, SCS_SIZE,
-					 VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END,
-					 GFP_SCS, PAGE_KERNEL,
-					 0, cpu_to_node(cpu),
-					 __builtin_return_address(0));
+int scs_init_sdei(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
 
-		per_cpu(irq_shadow_call_stack_ptr, cpu) = p;
-#else
-		per_cpu(irq_shadow_call_stack_ptr, cpu) =
-			per_cpu(irq_shadow_call_stack, cpu);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP)) {
+			if (scs_alloc_percpu(
+				&sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal_ptr, cpu) ||
+			    scs_alloc_percpu(
+				&sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical_ptr, cpu)) {
+				scs_free_sdei();
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			}
+		} else {
+			per_cpu(sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal_ptr, cpu) =
+				per_cpu(sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal, cpu);
+			per_cpu(sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical_ptr, cpu) =
+				per_cpu(sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical, cpu);
+		}
 	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
index ea94cf8f9dc6..3e85017a9c8b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/mmu.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
@@ -161,6 +162,12 @@ unsigned long sdei_arch_get_entry_point(int conduit)
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (scs_init_sdei()) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK))
+			free_sdei_stacks();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	sdei_exit_mode = (conduit == CONDUIT_HVC) ? SDEI_EXIT_HVC : SDEI_EXIT_SMC;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0

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