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Message-ID: <2fd3212a-915e-85cd-4be9-eb08b573382e@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 20:17:26 -0500
From: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
To: Boris Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/speculation: Fix incorrect MDS/TAA mitigation
status
On 11/15/19 3:21 PM, Boris Petkov wrote:
> On November 15, 2019 8:35:54 PM GMT+01:00, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
>> See the last sentence of the paragraph you replied to :)
> Proves even more that this should be documented in *all* places that talk about TAA cmdline options and we should not rely on references but write stuff out everywhere so that people can see it directly.
>
>> But serioulsy, yes we should mention the interaction in
>> kernel-parameters.txt as well. Something like:
>>
>> off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation.
>> + On TAA affected machines, mds=off can be prevented
>> + by an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities
>> + are mitigated with the same mechanism.
>>
>> and the other way round for TAA.
> Ack.
>
Sorry for late reply as I am out on Friday afternoon. On hindsight, I
should have added relevant description to kernel-parameters.txt as it is
the mostly read kernel document.
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
Thanks,
Longman
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