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Message-ID: <7f5c4546-0c1a-86ae-581e-0203b5fca446@pengutronix.de>
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 22:15:29 +0100
From: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@...gutronix.de>
To: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
syzbot <syzbot+b02ff0707a97e4e79ebb@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
davem@...emloft.net, glider@...gle.com, linux-can@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: KMSAN: uninit-value in can_receive
On 11/18/19 9:49 PM, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
>
>
> On 18/11/2019 21.29, Marc Kleine-Budde wrote:
>> On 11/18/19 9:25 PM, Oliver Hartkopp wrote:
>
>>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
>>>> Reported-by: syzbot+b02ff0707a97e4e79ebb@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>>>>
>>>> =====================================================
>>>> BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in can_receive+0x23c/0x5e0 net/can/af_can.c:649
>>>> CPU: 1 PID: 3490 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc5+ #0
>
>>>
>>> In line 649 of 5.4.0-rc5+ we can find a while() statement:
>>>
>>> while (!(can_skb_prv(skb)->skbcnt))
>>> can_skb_prv(skb)->skbcnt = atomic_inc_return(&skbcounter);
>>>
>>> In linux/include/linux/can/skb.h we see:
>>>
>>> static inline struct can_skb_priv *can_skb_prv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>>> {
>>> return (struct can_skb_priv *)(skb->head);
>>> }
>>>
>>> IMO accessing can_skb_prv(skb)->skbcnt at this point is a valid
>>> operation which has no uninitialized value.
>>>
>>> Can this probably be a false positive of KMSAN?
>>
>> The packet is injected via the packet socket into the kernel. Where does
>> skb->head point to in this case? When the skb is a proper
>> kernel-generated skb containing a CAN-2.0 or CAN-FD frame skb->head is
>> maybe properly initialized?
>
> The packet is either received via vcan or vxcan which checks via
> can_dropped_invalid_skb() if we have a valid ETH_P_CAN type skb.
According to the call stack it's injected into the kernel via a packet
socket and not via v(x)can.
> We additionally might think about introducing a check whether we have a
> can_skb_reserve() created skbuff.
>
> But even if someone forged a skbuff without this reserved space the
> access to can_skb_prv(skb)->skbcnt would point into some CAN frame
> content - which is still no access to uninitialized content, right?
Marc
--
Pengutronix e.K. | Marc Kleine-Budde |
Embedded Linux | https://www.pengutronix.de |
Vertretung West/Dortmund | Phone: +49-231-2826-924 |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |
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