linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 04/19] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE

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Date:   Mon, 18 Nov 2019 21:03:17 -0800
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@...oxin.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-edac@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 04/19] x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR
 at boot

On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 05:41:49PM +1300, Kai Huang wrote:
> On Mon, 2019-11-18 at 19:12 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Enable VMX if and only if the kernel may do VMXON at some point,
> > +	 * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
> > +	 * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)) {

Hmm, this should more specifically be CONFIG_KVM_INTEL.

> > +		msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
> > +		if (tboot_enabled())
> > +			msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
> > +	}
> 
> Why not also take this chance to enable SGX? Or it will come with SGX patch
> series?

The latter.  Similar to the KVM check, this shouldn't opt in to SGX unless
the kernel is capable of using SGX.

> > +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr);
> > +}
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> > index 4a900804a023..b7c6ed0b40b6 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
> > @@ -755,6 +755,8 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >  	/* Work around errata */
> >  	srat_detect_node(c);
> >  
> > +	init_feature_control_msr(c);
> 
> Will this compile if you disable CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR?
> 
> Provide an empty one in cpu.h if the config is not enabled?

CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR can't be disabled manually, it's selected
by CPU_SUP_INTEL (and by Zhaoxin/Centaur for their relevant patches).