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Message-ID: <20191119073924.GA32060@Red>
Date:   Tue, 19 Nov 2019 08:39:24 +0100
From:   Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>
To:     Maxime Ripard <mripard@...nel.org>
Cc:     davem@...emloft.net, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
        mark.rutland@....com, robh+dt@...nel.org, wens@...e.org,
        devicetree@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-sunxi@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] ARM: dts: sun8i: a33: add the new SecuritySystem
 compatible

On Mon, Nov 18, 2019 at 12:11:43PM +0100, Maxime Ripard wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2019 at 03:48:11PM +0100, Corentin Labbe wrote:
> > Add the new A33 SecuritySystem compatible to the crypto node.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a33.dtsi | 3 ++-
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a33.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a33.dtsi
> > index 1532a0e59af4..5680fa1de102 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a33.dtsi
> > +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a33.dtsi
> > @@ -215,7 +215,8 @@
> >  		};
> >
> >  		crypto: crypto-engine@...5000 {
> > -			compatible = "allwinner,sun4i-a10-crypto";
> > +			compatible = "allwinner,sun8i-a33-crypto",
> > +				     "allwinner,sun4i-a10-crypto";
> 
> If some algorithms aren't working properly, we can't really fall back
> to it, we should just use the a33 compatible.
> 

Since crypto selftest detect the problem, the fallback could be used and SS will just be in degraded mode (no sha1).
But since nobody reported this problem since 4 years (when SS was added in a33 dts), the absence of sha1 is clearly not an issue.

Regards

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