linux-kernel - RE: USB devices on Dell TB16 dock stop working after resuming

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Date:   Wed, 20 Nov 2019 17:41:43 +0000
From:   <Mario.Limonciello@...l.com>
To:     <yehezkelshb@...il.com>
CC:     <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>, <pmenzel@...gen.mpg.de>,
        <andreas.noever@...il.com>, <michael.jamet@...el.com>,
        <ck@...om.net>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <anthony.wong@...onical.com>
Subject: RE: USB devices on Dell TB16 dock stop working after resuming

> > But I mean this is generally an unsafe (but convenient) option, it means that you
> > throw out security pre-boot, and all someone needs to do is turn off your
> machine,
> > plug in a malicious device, turn it on and then they have malicious device all the
> way
> > into OS.
> 
> Only if the attacker found how to forge the device UUID (and knew what UUIDs
> are allowed), isn't it? Unless you take into account things like
> external GPU box,
> where it's pretty easy to replace the card installed inside it.

Notice, I never said it was easy :)

In order to turn that on something like that "generally" safely you need to have
mitigations like pre boot DMA protection in place.