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Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 08:33:03 -0500
From: Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>
To: Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
"Peter, Matthias" <matthias.peter@....bund.de>,
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>,
Roman Drahtmueller <draht@...altsekun.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v25 09/12] LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source
On Sat, Nov 16, 2019 at 10:36:52AM +0100, Stephan Müller wrote:
> The Jitter RNG fast noise source implemented as part of the kernel
> crypto API is queried for 256 bits of entropy at the time the seed
> buffer managed by the LRNG is about to be filled.
>
> CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>
> CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>
> CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
> CC: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
> CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
> CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>
> CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>
> CC: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
> CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>
> CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>
> CC: zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
> CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>
> CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
> Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>
> Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@...altsekun.de>
> Tested-by: Roman Drahtmüller <draht@...altsekun.de>
> Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>
> Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
> ---
> drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig | 11 +++++
> drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
> index 03e6e2ec356b..80fc723c67d2 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Kconfig
> @@ -80,4 +80,15 @@ config LRNG_KCAPI
> provided by the selected kernel crypto API RNG.
> endif # LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH
>
> +config LRNG_JENT
> + bool "Enable Jitter RNG as LRNG Seed Source"
> + select CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
> + help
> + The Linux RNG may use the Jitter RNG as noise source. Enabling
> + this option enables the use of the Jitter RNG. Its default
> + entropy level is 16 bits of entropy per 256 data bits delivered
> + by the Jitter RNG. This entropy level can be changed at boot
> + time or at runtime with the lrng_base.jitterrng configuration
> + variable.
> +
> endif # LRNG
> diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
> index 027b6ea51c20..a87d800c9aae 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
> @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRNG_SWITCH) += lrng_switch.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_DRBG) += lrng_drbg.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_KCAPI) += lrng_kcapi.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_JENT) += lrng_jent.o
> diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..43114a44b8f5
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_jent.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
> +/*
> + * LRNG Fast Noise Source: Jitter RNG
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019, Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
> + */
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
> +
> +#include "lrng_internal.h"
> +
> +/*
> + * Estimated entropy of data is a 16th of LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS.
> + * Albeit a full entropy assessment is provided for the noise source indicating
> + * that it provides high entropy rates and considering that it deactivates
> + * when it detects insufficient hardware, the chosen under estimation of
> + * entropy is considered to be acceptable to all reviewers.
> + */
> +static u32 jitterrng = LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS>>4;
> +module_param(jitterrng, uint, 0644);
> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(jitterrng, "Entropy in bits of 256 data bits from Jitter "
> + "RNG noise source");
> +
> +/**
> + * Get Jitter RNG entropy
> + *
> + * @outbuf buffer to store entropy
> + * @outbuflen length of buffer
> + * @return > 0 on success where value provides the added entropy in bits
> + * 0 if no fast source was available
> + */
> +struct rand_data;
> +struct rand_data *jent_lrng_entropy_collector(void);
> +int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
> + unsigned int len);
> +static struct rand_data *lrng_jent_state;
> +
> +u32 lrng_get_jent(u8 *outbuf, unsigned int outbuflen)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + u32 ent_bits = jitterrng;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lrng_jent_lock);
> + static int lrng_jent_initialized = 0;
> +
> + spin_lock_irqsave(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
> +
> + if (!ent_bits || (lrng_jent_initialized == -1)) {
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
this works, but I think you can avoid the use of the spin lock on the read calls
here. If you assign a global pointer to the value of &lrng_jent_state on init,
you can just take the spinlock on assignment, and assume its stable after that
(which it should be given that its only ever going to point to a static data
structure).
Neil
> + if (!lrng_jent_initialized) {
> + lrng_jent_state = jent_lrng_entropy_collector();
> + if (!lrng_jent_state) {
> + jitterrng = 0;
> + lrng_jent_initialized = -1;
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
> + pr_info("Jitter RNG unusable on current system\n");
> + return 0;
> + }
> + lrng_jent_initialized = 1;
> + pr_debug("Jitter RNG working on current system\n");
> + }
> + ret = jent_read_entropy(lrng_jent_state, outbuf, outbuflen);
> + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lrng_jent_lock, flags);
> +
> + if (ret) {
> + pr_debug("Jitter RNG failed with %d\n", ret);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + /* Obtain entropy statement */
> + if (outbuflen != LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BYTES)
> + ent_bits = (ent_bits * outbuflen<<3) /
> + LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS;
> + /* Cap entropy to buffer size in bits */
> + ent_bits = min_t(u32, ent_bits, outbuflen<<3);
> + pr_debug("obtained %u bits of entropy from Jitter RNG noise source\n",
> + ent_bits);
> +
> + return ent_bits;
> +}
> +
> +u32 lrng_jent_entropylevel(void)
> +{
> + return min_t(u32, jitterrng, LRNG_DRNG_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS);
> +}
> --
> 2.23.0
>
>
>
>
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