linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] proc: Make /proc/<pid>/io world readable

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Message-Id: <0e878d0f-0e2b-495d-bc9a-f9663f18d3fa@www.fastmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 21 Nov 2019 13:25:47 -0800
From:   "Daniel Xu" <dxu@...uu.xyz>
To:     adobriyan@...il.com, christian@...uner.io,
        akpm@...ux-foundation.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mhocko@...e.com,
        keescook@...omium.org, shakeelb@...gle.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
        khlebnikov@...dex-team.ru, kent.overstreet@...il.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     dschatzberg@...com, htejun@...com, dennis@...nel.org,
        "Kernel Team" <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: Make /proc/<pid>/io world readable

On Thu, Nov 21, 2019, at 1:09 PM, Daniel Xu wrote:
> /proc/<pid>/io is currently only owner readable. This forces monitoring
> programs (such as atop) to run with elevated permissions to collect disk
> stats. Changing this file to world readable can add a measure of safety to
> userspace.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@...uu.xyz>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ebea9501afb8..1d1c1d680e16 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -3076,7 +3076,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	REG("coredump_filter", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_coredump_filter_operations),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
> -	ONE("io",	S_IRUSR, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
> +	ONE("io",	S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_io_accounting),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
>  	REG("uid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
> @@ -3473,7 +3473,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	REG("fail-nth", 0644, proc_fail_nth_operations),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
> -	ONE("io",	S_IRUSR, proc_tid_io_accounting),
> +	ONE("io",	S_IRUGO, proc_tid_io_accounting),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
>  	REG("uid_map",    S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 
>

Nevermind, abandoning. Just found 1d1221f375c94ef961b ("proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io").