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Message-Id: <20191127202918.214267481@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:32:08 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.3 51/95] x86/stackframe/32: Repair 32-bit Xen PV

From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>

commit 81ff2c37f9e5d77593928df0536d86443195fd64 upstream.

Once again RPL checks have been introduced which don't account for a 32-bit
kernel living in ring 1 when running in a PV Xen domain. The case in
FIXUP_FRAME has been preventing boot.

Adjust BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 as well to guard against future uses of the macro
on a code path reachable when running in PV mode under Xen; I have to admit
that I stopped at a certain point trying to figure out whether there are
present ones.

Fixes: 3c88c692c287 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0fad341f-b7f5-f859-d55d-f0084ee7087e@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S      |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h |   12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
 	.if \no_user_check == 0
 	/* coming from usermode? */
-	testl	$SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
+	testl	$USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
 	jz	.Lend_\@
 	.endif
 	/* On user-cr3? */
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@
 	testl	$X86_EFLAGS_VM, 4*4(%esp)
 	jnz	.Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
 #endif
-	testl	$SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 3*4(%esp)
+	testl	$USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 3*4(%esp)
 	jnz	.Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
 
 	orl	$CS_FROM_KERNEL, 3*4(%esp)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/segment.h
@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@
  */
 #define SEGMENT_RPL_MASK	0x3
 
+/*
+ * When running on Xen PV, the actual privilege level of the kernel is 1,
+ * not 0. Testing the Requested Privilege Level in a segment selector to
+ * determine whether the context is user mode or kernel mode with
+ * SEGMENT_RPL_MASK is wrong because the PV kernel's privilege level
+ * matches the 0x3 mask.
+ *
+ * Testing with USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK is valid for both native and Xen PV
+ * kernels because privilege level 2 is never used.
+ */
+#define USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK	0x2
+
 /* User mode is privilege level 3: */
 #define USER_RPL		0x3
 


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