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Message-Id: <1575458192.5241.99.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2019 06:16:32 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
eric.snowberg@...cle.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
matthewgarrett@...gle.com, sashal@...nel.org,
jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 5/6] IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys
[Cc'ing Mat Martineau]
On Tue, 2019-12-03 at 15:37 -0800, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> On 12/3/2019 12:06 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> > Suppose both root and uid 1000 define a keyring named "foo". The
> > current "keyrings=foo" will measure all keys added to either keyring
> > named "foo". There needs to be a way to limit measuring keys to a
> > particular keyring named "foo".
> >
> > Mimi
>
> Thanks for clarifying.
>
> Suppose two different non-root users create keyring with the same name
> "foo" and, say, both are measured, how would we know which keyring
> measurement belongs to which user?
>
> Wouldn't it be sufficient to include only keyrings created by "root"
> (UID value 0) in the key measurement? This will include all the builtin
> trusted keyrings (such as .builtin_trusted_keys,
> .secondary_trusted_keys, .ima, .evm, etc.).
>
> What would be the use case for including keyrings created by non-root
> users in key measurement?
>
> Also, since the UID for non-root users can be any integer value (greater
> than 0), can an an administrator craft a generic IMA policy that would
> be applicable to all clients in an enterprise?
The integrity subsystem, and other concepts upstreamed to support it,
are being used by different people/companies in different ways. I
know some of the ways, but not all, as how it is being used. For
example, Mat Martineau gave an LSS2019-NA talk titled "Using and
Implementing Keyring Restrictions for Userspace". I don't know if he
would be interested in measuring keys on these restricted userspace
keyrings, but before we limit how a new feature works, we should at
least look to see if that limitation is really necessary.
Mimi
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