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Message-ID: <fdd428a9-1906-410c-99b0-c9568a72f320@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 19:21:32 +0300
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
elena.reshetova@...el.com,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@...gle.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/3] perf/core: apply CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CPUs and kernel
monitoring
Enable CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process with secure performance monitoring
of available online CPUs, when executing code in kernel and user modes.
For backward compatibility reasons performance monitoring functionality of
perf_events subsystem remains available under CAP_SYS_ADMIN but its usage for
secure performance monitoring use cases is discouraged with respect to the
introduced CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 34c7c6910026..e8dc8411de9a 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 &&
+ !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 &&
+ !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
--
2.20.1
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